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Abstract 
 
 
This paper addresses three questions relating to the very extensive use of the GTAP global 
trade protection database: Are there additional price-distorting policy instruments worthy of 
inclusion in the base year? What is the appropriate counterfactual set of price distortions in 
the year of concern (such as when a proposed reform is expected to be fully implemented, as 
distinct from the base year)? And how are the price distortions (e.g. tariff rates) on individual 
products aggregated to the GTAP product groups? We show the estimated welfare effects of 
policies can change substantially when more-appropriate measures of distortions are used.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ex ante or ex post economic analyses of the consequences of multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral negotiations between countries on international trade (or international 
environmental) policy issues rely increasingly on multisectoral, multiregional computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models of the global economy. Outputs from such models can 
indicate the likely production, consumption, price, trade, welfare, income distributional, 
poverty and environmental effects of past or prospective policy actions relative to a baseline 
or counterfactual simulation. Milestone multilateral trade examples are ex post analyses of 
the GATT’s Uruguay Round agreements (see, e.g., the collection in Martin and Winters 
1996) and ex ante analyses of possible agreements to emerge from the World Trade 
Organization’s Doha Development Agenda (see, e.g., Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren 
2005; Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006a).  
 The focus of attention on such modeling results varies enormously across users. 
Multilateral and regional institutions and non-government organizations are interested in the 
global welfare and trade results and how they are shared between high-income and 
developing countries and among the various regions of the world. They are also interested in 
how much of any particular effect (such as on global economic welfare) is attributable to the 
policies of particular groups of countries, sectors, or policy instruments. By contrast, national 
governments are more interested in how their own economy and its trade will be affected and 
how much of those effects are due to own-country policies (over which they can act) versus 
policies of the rest of the world (over which they have little if any influence other than as 
participants in international negotiations). Estimates of the effects of own-country policies 
could be obtained using a national model, but a global model is required to estimate the 
effects on their terms of trade of other countries’ policies. Other users of model outputs 
include private vested interest groups expecting to be helped or harmed economically by 
particular policy changes under consideration, and community groups interested in indicators 
such as environmental consequences or the effects on income inequality and poverty. 
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 While it is sometimes possible to use econometrics to analyse ex post the effects of 
past policy changes on some variables of interest, there is no better way to analyse ex ante 
alternative trade, product tax/subsidy and other sectoral policies than model simulation. Even 
if only one sector is directly involved, there will be indirect effects on other sectors so 
economywide modeling is needed. For that reason CGE analysis has become a mainstream 
contributor to policy dialogue,1 and CGE models and their databases and parameter sets are 
now very closely scrutinized by those with a stake in their findings.2
An obvious starting point of such scrutiny is the representation in the model of the 
actual policies in place and of the alternatives under consideration. The creation of the Global 
Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University involved not only development of a global CGE 
model (the GTAP Model – see Hertel 1997, 2013) but also a database that has been updated 
periodically. The version of that database used in this chapter (Version 7) relates to 2004, and 
previous versions still available at 
  
www.gtap.org are for 2001 and 1997. The GTAP database 
is a consistent representation of the world economy in the base year, and underlying it are 
national input-output tables, bilateral trade and macroeconomic data, and import protection 
and agricultural subsidy estimates for 113 countries/regions and 57 sectors/product groups. 
This is now by far the most widely used trade and protection database in the world. 
The GTAP protection data are predominently based on aggregated tariffs on imports 
plus agricultural production and export subsidies in a past year (2004 in the case of Version 
7), which raises at least three concerns. First, are there other price-distorting policy 
instruments besides import tariffs and OECD farm subsidies worthy of inclusion in the base 
year? Second, what is the appropriate counterfactual set of price distortions in the year of 
concern (such as when a proposed reform is expected to be fully implemented) as distinct 
from the base year? And third, how are the price distortions (e.g. tariff rates) on individual 
products aggregated to the GTAP product groups?3
                                                          
1 Australia was perhaps the first country to successfully mainstream economy-wide analysis into national policy 
debate (Powell and Snape 1993), beginning with the ORANI Model (Dixon et al. 1977, 1982). 
  
2 An example is the scrutiny given to the World Bank’s Linkage Model results on the global cost of trade-related 
policies, which prompted a paper by the Model’s creator explaining why those numbers changed over time (van 
der Mensbrugghe 2006). 
3 A fourth concern is that tariffs do not capture distortions in the service sector, but this chapter confines itself 
just to policies aimed at distorting the prices of goods. On the potential importance of services trade and 
investment policies, see for example Francois and Hoekman (2010), Christen, Francois and Hoekman (2013) 
and Tarr (2013). They are ignored here because much controversy still surrounds their measurement and how 
they should be modeled. This is reflected in the results emerging from attempts to include services distortions in 
trade reform modeling, which have led to widely differing results. Compare, for example, Brown, Deardorff and 
Stern (2003), Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005), and Hertel and Keeney (2006). Fortunately this 
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This chapter addresses each of these concerns, and uses the World Bank’s Linkage 
Model (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) as well as the GTAP Model (Hertel 1997) to assess their 
significance. It does so by first estimating the effects of goods trade-related policies as of 
2004 using the standard Version 7 GTAP protection database (Narayanan and Walmsley 
2008). These are then compared with the effects using alternative protection databases. A 
series of effects are examined including national welfare, international product prices, 
national factor prices and sectoral contributions to GDP, and the sectoral and regional policy 
contributions to global welfare and trade. Since agricultural distortions have been estimated 
to contribute in recent years to around two-thirds of the global welfare cost of policy 
distortions to goods markets and to have severely limited trade in farm products, special 
attention is given to the effects on that sector. Such indicators include the developing 
countries’ share of global agricultural production and trade, and the shares of production of 
various agricultural goods exported and of consumption imported by different regions and 
globally.  
 
 
2. The concern with missing price-distorting measures  
 
Historically, tariff measures have been the predominant form of negotiable distortions 
affecting manufacturing trade, but in agriculture many other instruments are employed to 
distort producer and consumer incentives. This has been dealt with in the GTAP protection 
database by making use of the OECD Secretariat’s estimates of price distortions (OECD 
2010). More specifically, domestic price of a farm good in high-income countries may be 
distorted not only by trade restrictions or trade subsidies but also by producer price subsidies 
and other forms of domestic support. These have been carefully incorporated in the GTAP 
protection database (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008, Ch. 10),  
Until recently there were no such comparable estimates for agricultural price 
distortions in developing countries, however, so the only significant interventions included in 
the GTAP database for the farm sector of those countries are applied import tariffs. That is 
unfortunate, because it thereby ignores not only the developing countries’ farm producer 
price or export subsidies but also, and potentially more importantly, any production or export 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
situation may now improve as a new database on services trade restrictions has just been released by Borchert, 
Gootiiz and Mattoo (2012). 
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taxes or tax equivalents and any food import subsidies in place in those countries. 
Fortunately, a recent World Bank research project has generated a time series of ad valorem 
nominal rates of assistance to farmers and consumer tax equivalents to consumers (NRAs and 
CTEs) over the past half century for 41 developing countries that together account for just 
over half of global agricultural production and consumption (Anderson and Valenzuela 
2008). The coverage involves an average of 11 key farm products per country, and those 
products account for around 70 percent of the value at undistorted prices of each country’s 
overall agricultural output. For the developing countries in that sample, border measures are 
the major intervention. Their price-distorting impact is estimated by comparing the domestic 
wholesale price of a good with that of a like product at the country’s border (adjusted 
appropriately for differences in quality, processing, etc. and for domestic transport costs if the 
domestic price was not measured at the border). The border price used was normally the c.i.f. 
import unit value or the f.o.b. export unit value, depending on whether the product is an 
import-competing good or an exportable. In the few cases where authors identified a producer 
or consumer price subsidy or tax (not including generic VAT/GST), its ad valorem equivalent 
was estimated and added to the NRA or CTE, respectively, for that product (Anderson et al. 
2008). Using those estimates, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008) provide for modelers an 
alternative set of estimates of agricultural price distortions in developing countries to those 
provided for 2004 in the GTAP 7.0 Database. The preferential bilateral tariff structures 
included in the standard GTAP Version 7.0 Database are maintained by multiplying each 
bilateral tariff by the ratio of the aggregate import tariff equivalent measure from the World 
Bank project to the original GTAP aggregate national tariff for each product. 
This approach allows us to evaluate the possible bias in not including developing 
countries’ non-tariff farm policy measures. We do so by re-estimating the price, trade and 
welfare effects of 2004 trade-related policies and comparing them with those generated by 
the Linkage Model using the standard GTAP Version 7.0 protection database for 2004.  
This new agricultural distortions database for developing countries also allows a 
reassessment of an issue that became quite controversial in the early stages of the WTO’s 
Doha negotiations. It has to do with the question of whether global trade distortions still harm 
developing country farm industries – many more of whom receive protection from imports 
now than in the past (Anderson 2010a). Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006b) 
and Anderson and Valenzuela (2007a) each focus on this issue using the 2001 GTAP 
protection database (the first using the Linkage Model, the second using the GTAP Model). 
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Here we re-look at the issue using the Linkage model and 2004 distortions, comparing the 
results generated using the new World Bank agricultural distortion estimates and those using 
the standard GTAP Version 7 estimates. 
 
2.1 Price distortions in global goods markets 
 
Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments distort prices 
in their domestic markets for tradable merchandise, with the relative prices of the various 
goods being affected by trade taxes or subsidies. Even for agriculture, product-specific 
domestic output or farm input subsidies have played a more limited role, as have food 
consumer subsidies, in part because of their much greater overt cost to the treasury. 
To estimate the impacts of 2004 policies with an alternative database, the Altertax 
procedure (Malcolm 1998) is used to amend the distortions in Version 7 of the GTAP global 
protection database.4 The amendments are mainly for farm price distortions in developing 
countries but, following Anderson and Valenzuela (2007b), cotton distortions in the United 
States also are altered, to better reflect policies there. To simplify the discussion below, the 
European transition economies’ group (in which Turkey is included for convenience) is 
treated as one of the world’s developing country regions, the others being Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.5
Version 7 of the GTAP database includes estimates of bilateral agricultural tariffs and 
export subsidies and of domestic farm price supports as of 2004 for more than 100 countries 
and country groups spanning the world. The protection data come from a joint CEPII 
(Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project known as MAcMaps. MAcMaps is a detailed database on 
bilateral import protection at the HS6 tariff line level that integrates trade preferences, 
specific and compound tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs).
  
6
                                                          
4 Altertax is a procedure that allows for modifying price distorting policies in the original GTAP database with 
an alternative set of policies. It is designed to minimize deviations of the base year data from original estimates 
and to maintain the accounting consistency of the global database. In the application here, Altertax allows the 
insertion of the DAI database in the standard GTAP 7 database with minimal disruptions to the original data. In 
particular, all original policy distortions that are not modified by the DAI database are unaffected. 
 A virtue of having bilateral tariffs is that they capture not only reciprocal but 
also non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements, the latter providing low-income exporters 
5 There are no new price distortion estimates for countries in the Middle East, so in what follows little attention 
is given to this small and relatively affluent part of the global agricultural economy. 
6 More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2008) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For details of its incorporation into the GTAP Version 7 
dataset, see Narayanan and Walmsley (2008).  
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duty-free access to protected high-income country markets. This allows us to take into 
account the fact that future reform may cause a decline in the international terms of trade for 
those developing countries that are enjoying preferential access to agricultural and other 
markets of high-income countries. 
The sectoral averages of the standard GTAP database distortions, and the values from 
the Distortions to Agricultural Incentives project (hereafter the DAI database), are shown by 
instrument in Table 1. In both databases the weighted average applied import tax for non-
farm goods in 2004 was just over 6 percent for developing countries and 1.7 percent for high-
income countries, while for agriculture and lightly processed food it was much higher: around 
24 percent for high-income countries and around half that for developing countries. Export 
subsidies for farm products for a few high-income regions, and export taxes in a few 
developing countries, were still in place in 2004, but they are generally small in their impact 
compared with import tariffs, as are production subsidies or taxes. At the most aggregated 
level the averages for 2004 in the GTAP Version 7 and the DAI databases are similar, except 
for the inclusion of developing countries’ agricultural production and export taxes in the 
latter but not the former database. The trade taxes differ also because domestic-to-border 
price comparisons pick up the impact of any non-tariff border restrictions, thereby making 
their tariff equivalent higher than just the applied tariff rate. There are, however, two reasons 
why the DAI database rates might be lower than the GTAP ones. One is that if the 
domestically produced and imported products are not close substitutes in consumption, then 
the impact on the domestic price of an import tariff will be less than if they are perfect 
substitutes – and this is captured iby the domestic-to-border price comparison methodology 
used to generate the DAI database. The other is that the DAI’s price comparison method also 
captures export restrictions or import or export subsidies, and the effects of producer or 
consumer subsidies or taxes.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
  For all the above reasons, the DAI database can be considered more comprehensive 
than the GTAP protection database for capturing distortions to agricultural incentives in 
developing countries. In some cases this means the DAI rates are higher than the GTAP rates 
in Table 1, but in the important cases of China and India they are considerably lower.7
                                                          
7 The China and India estimates are based on careful country case studies by nationals very familiar with the 
most reliable price data. See Huang et al. (2009) and Pursell, Gulati and Gupta (2009).  
 This 
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could lead one to expect the estimated welfare cost to developing countries of their own 
policies to be less using the DAI rates than the GTAP rates. 
   
2.2 The Linkage Model of the global economy 
 
The model used for this section is the World Bank’s global computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, known as Linkage (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). For more than a decade it has 
formed the basis for the World Bank’s standard long-term projections of the world economy 
and for much of its trade (and more recently migration) policy analysis (e.g., World Bank 
2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). The standard version of Linkage is typically implemented as 
a recursive dynamic model with a base year (currently 2004) and solved forward towards a 
terminal year. Each solution year is solved as a comparative static model with fixed factors of 
production. The annual equilibria are linked via dynamic equations that update population 
and labor stocks (using demographic projections), capital stock (through cumulative savings 
decisions adjusted for depreciation) and assumptions regarding productivity growth (and 
other efficiency type factors such as energy use and transportation margins). 
 The comparative static version of Linkage is in many ways similar in spirit to 
comparative static models such as the GTAP model (described in Hertel 1997). Producers 
minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers 
maximize utility, and all markets – including for labor – are cleared with flexible prices. 
Production is modeled using a nested structure of constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
functions that aims to capture the substitution and complements across all inputs into 
production.8 There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the 
substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming;9
                                                          
8 Nested CES production structures are a relatively common specification for production in CGE models, 
although top-level flexible functional forms have also been implemented (see, e.g. Jorgenson, Jin and Slesnick 
2013). 
 livestock sectors reflect 
the substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors 
reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, 
and the total employment of each is assumed fixed (so no change in their unemployment 
levels) but both are assumed to be intersectorally mobile. There is a single representative 
household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended linear 
9 Where land is relatively cheap, production increases will lead to land expansion (extensification), where land 
is scarce and expensive, production increases rely on more intense use of inputs such as capital and agricultural 
chemicals. 
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expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington (1969) structure in which 
aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between domestic 
goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across source 
countries to determine the bilateral trade flows.10
Government fiscal balances are fixed in US dollar terms, with the fiscal objective 
being met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of 
tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households.
 
11 The current account 
balance also is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this implies that ex 
ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real exchange rate. 
For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and additional 
imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed 
public and foreign saving, investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of 
households and from changes in the unit cost of investment. 12
The results in this (and the next) section are based on the comparative static version of 
Linkage, so they do not include the (often much larger) dynamic gains that result from an 
acceleration in investment due to the reduction in tariffs on industrial goods lowering the cost 
of investment. Also missing, therefore, are any costs of adjustment to reform. And because 
this version of the Linkage Model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale, 
it captures none of the benefits of freeing markets that could come from accelerated 
 The model only solves for 
relative prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of 
manufactured exports from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base 
year. 
                                                          
10 The size of the Armington elasticities matters (see Valenzuela, Anderson and Hertel (2008) and Zhang and 
Osborne (2009)). The Linkage model assumes larger values than some other models because it is seeking to 
estimate long-run consequences of liberalization. An example of the difference this can make to the results is 
detailed in Anderson and Martin (2006, table 12A.2).  
11 There are other possible fiscal closure rules, some of which are likely to more closely match what policy 
makers would actually implement. The advantage of assuming a fixed deficit, fixed government expenditures 
and lump sum taxes are two-fold. The first assumption deflects from a discussion on the sustainability of the 
fiscal deficit. The latter two assumptions simplify welfare analysis, albeit still in a second-best world given all of 
the existing distortions in the model. 
12 Linkage has not been designed to determine investment behaviour. The fixed trade balance assumption, 
similar to the fixed fiscal deficit assumption, has the benefit of avoiding a discussion on the sustainability of a 
changing trade balance. It is also consistent with the Feldstein-Horioka finding of a strong correlation between 
domestic savings and investment (Feldstein-Horioka 1980). The GTAP model allows for some international 
capital flows responding to changes in rates of return across countries. The G-Cubed model has a more 
consistent representation of investment behaviour (including consistent stock/flow equations) and is better able 
to look at the cross-border investment related aspects of trade reform (see McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2012). 
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productivity growth, scale economies, and the creation of new markets. There is also a 
dampening effect on estimates of welfare gains because of product and regional aggregation, 
which hides many of the differences across products in rates of distortions. The results 
therefore should be treated as providing very much lower-bound estimates of the net 
economic welfare benefits from policy reform.13
The version of the Linkage model used in this section is based on an aggregation 
involving 23 sectors and 49 individual countries plus 11 country groups spanning the world 
(see van der Mensbrugghe, Valenzuela and Anderson 2010). There is an emphasis on 
agriculture and food, which comprise 16 of those 23 sectors. Note that, consistent with the 
WTO, we include Korea and Taiwan in the ‘developing country’ category.
 
14
 
 
2.3 Effects of global removal of price-distorting policies 
 
To see what could result from removing policies as of 2004, we examine in this sub-section 
the results from full global liberalization of both agricultural policies and non-agricultural 
goods trade policies. We do so first using the DAI database, and then using the standard 
GTAP database.15
 
 We examine several indicators, including global and national economic 
welfare, quantities produced and traded, and product prices; and we also look at how global 
trade distortions affect developing country agriculture. 
2.3.1 Global and national economic welfare 
 
Beginning with the DAI baseline of the world economy in 2004, all agricultural domestic and 
trade subsidies and taxes plus import tariffs on other merchandise, as summarized in the left-
hand half of Table 1,16
                                                          
13 As well, the model does not include any divergences between private and social marginal costs and benefits 
that might arise from externalities, market failures, and other behind-the-border policies not represented in our 
amended GTAP protection database. These omissions could affect the welfare estimates in either direction.  
 are removed globally. Our Linkage model simulation suggests that 
would lead to a global gain of $168 billion per year (left-hand half of Table 2). As a share of 
14 The more-affluent economies of Hong Kong and Singapore are in our high-income category but, since they 
have close to free trade policies and almost no farm production anyway, their influence on the results is not 
noticeable. 
15 The DAI results were first reported in Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009), and were 
elaborated on in Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2010), but they have not before been 
published alongside comparable results based on the GTAP protection database. 
16 The only other policy change is the removal of export taxes on non-farm products in Argentina This is done 
because they were introduced at the same time (end-2001) and for the same reason (for the government to gain 
popular support from the urban poor) as were the country’s export taxes on farm products.   
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national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as much as high-income 
countries by completing that reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared 
with 0.5 percent for high-income countries, using as weights each country’s economic size). 
Thus in this broad sense of a world of just two large country groups, completing the global 
reform process would reduce international inequality to use the Milanovic (2005) term.17
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 The 
results vary widely across developing countries, however, ranging from slight losses in the 
case of some South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries that would suffer exceptionally 
large adverse terms of trade changes, to an 8 percent increase in the case of Ecuador (whose 
main export item, bananas is currently heavily discriminated against in the EU market where 
former colonies and least developed countries enjoy preferential duty-free access).  
 If one were to treat each of the 60 regions in Table 2 as able to be represented by a 
single household (that is, ignoring intra-region inequality), income inequality between 
countries as measured by the Gini Coefficient would be reduced at least slightly, from 0.8513 
to 0.8506.18
The second column of numbers and those in parentheses in Table 2 show the amount 
of that welfare gain due to changes in the international terms of trade for each country. For 
developing countries as a group the terms of trade effect is slightly negative, and conversely 
for high-income countries. 
 
19
The right-hand half of Table 2 reports the same results but using the standard GTAP 
price distortion database. Several differences with the above numbers are worth noting, 
bearing in mind that the GTAP price distortion estimates are less comprehensive than the 
ones in the DAI database. First, it overstates the global gain, at $210 billion compares with 
 
                                                          
17 This would continue a process that began in the 1980s, when many countries began to reform their trade and 
exchange rate regimes. Using the same Linkage model and database as the present study, Valenzuela, van der 
Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) found that the global reforms between 1980-84 and 2004 also boosted 
economic welfare in developing countries proportionately more than in high-income economies (by 1.0 percent, 
compared with 0.7 percent for high-income countries).  
18 This is a measure of inter-country inequality, again in the Milanovic (2005) sense of treating each country as a 
single observation and not taking into account its economic size. It is calculated using the 60 regions and 
Deaton’s Gini coefficient calculation:  
                   
where N is the number of regions, u is the sample average GDP per capita, Pi is the GDP per capita sample rank 
(with the highest being 1 and the lowest a rank of N) and Xi is the GDP per capita of country i. 
 
19 The terms of trade component is measured as the difference in the value of the trade balance at base year 
prices versus ex post trade prices. It is an average of the measure using base year volumes and post-simulation 
trade volumes. 
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the DAI estimate of $168 billion per year. Most of that difference is accounted for by 
developing country gains (overstated by 41 percent). However, the gain to high-income 
countries is also overstated (by 15 percent). Among the developing countries it is in Asia, 
especially China, India, Korea and Vietnam, where the differences are greatest: an 
overestimation by 71 percent. The main reason is that the applied tariffs used in the GTAP 
database for those countries evidently overstate the actual protection provided by those 
tariffs, as revealed by the domestic-to-border comparisons used to estimate DAI distortions. 
Notice also that the opposite is true for Argentina: because export taxes are included in the 
DAI database, the estimated gain from reform is greater for Argentina and thereby all of 
Latin America (by 16 percent) – even though the removal of those taxes turns the terms of 
trade against it to the point of more than offsetting the terms-of-trade benefit it receives from 
the removal of farm protection in the rest of the world.  
 
2.3.2 Regional and sectoral distribution of welfare effects 
 
One way to decompose the estimated real income gains that would result from full removal 
of price distortions globally, so as to better understand the sources of gain for each region, is 
to assess the impacts of developing country liberalization versus high-income country 
liberalization in different economic sectors. These results are provided in Table 3. The DAI-
based results suggest global liberalization of agriculture and food markets would contribute 
70 percent of the total global gains from merchandise reform. This is between the 63 per cent 
found for 2015 by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006b) using the earlier 
Version 6 of the GTAP database anchored on 2001 estimates, and the 76 percent found using 
Version 7 of the GTAP database (final column of Table 3).20
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 This robust result of roughly 
between two-thirds and three-quarters is remarkably high given the low shares of agriculture 
and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade of less than one-eighth. For developing 
countries, the importance of agricultural policies is even slightly greater. The slightly lower 
result from using the DAI database is again because the applied tariffs used in the GTAP 
database overstate the actual protection provided by tariffs in some developing countries, and 
notwithstanding the presence of export taxes in the DAI database.  
                                                          
20 It is also close to the 66 percent found for 2001 by Hertel and Keeney (2006, Table 2.9) using the GTAP-
AGR Model and the Version 6 GTAP database, and the 62-64 percent found for 2030 by Anderson and Strutt 
(2011) using a projection from 2004 of the GTAP Model and the DAI database. 
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More than two-thirds of those global gains that could come from removing 
agricultural policies are accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries (see 
columns 3 and 6 of Table 3, 49 of 70 percent using the DAI database and 45 of 76 percent 
using GTAP Version 7 protection data). Those policies also account for half of the overall 
gains to developing countries from global agricultural and trade policy reforms (column 1 of 
Table 3). This again is less than the GTAP database result, which at 62 percent is an 
overestimate of one-quarter. 
 
2.3.3 Quantities produced and traded 
 
The full global liberalization results suggest there would be little change in the developing 
countries’ aggregate shares of global output and exports of non-farm products other than for 
textiles and apparel. Their shares in agricultural and processed food markets, however, 
change noticeably: the export share rises from 54 to 64 percent and the output share rises 
from 46 to 50 percent. The rises occur in nearly all agricultural and food industries. As a 
result, the share of global production of farm products that is exported rises dramatically for 
many industries and, for the sector as a whole (excluding intra-EU trade), it increases from 8 
to 13 percent using the DAI database (Table 4). That ‘thickening’ of international food 
markets – which is only slightly less than suggested using the GTAP database – would have a 
substantial dampening effect on the instability of prices and quantities traded in those 
markets. This is because it increases the scope for (e.g., weather-induced) shortages in one 
region to be offset by above-average yields in other regions (Tyers and Anderson 1992). 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
The impact of full trade reform on agricultural and food output and trade is shown for 
each country/region in Table 5, where it is clear that global farm trade is enhanced by around 
two-fifths (6 percentage points higher using the GTAP database) whereas the global value of 
output is virtually unchanged (dropping just 3 percent). The anti-trade biases in the policies 
of both groups of countries reinforce each other in reducing the volume of global trade, 
whereas the output expansion due to the pro-agricultural policies of high-income countries 
are not quite fully offset by the output reduction of the anti-agricultural policies of developing 
countries. The doubling of exports of those goods from developing countries would be worth 
a huge $170 billion per year. Latin America accounts for nearly half of that increase using the 
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DAI database (compared with an estimated one-third using the GTAP database),21
[insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 but all 
developing regions’ exports expand. This means their share of production exported would be 
much higher. It would increase for almost all developing countries, rising in aggregate for the 
group from 9.5 to 17 percent (Table 6).  
Also of interest is what happens to agricultural imports: developing countries as a 
group would see them growing less than half as much as farm exports, and less using the DAI 
database than the GTAP one (Table 5), although the extent of that difference varies a lot 
across the various developing country regions.  
Together those changes mean their food and agricultural self sufficiency ratios would 
change. The change in aggregate is only slight though: for high-income countries that ratio 
would fall five percentage points, while for developing countries it would rise five percentage 
points (or two points for primary farm products and seven points for processed food – see 
Table 7). When broken down by developing country region, food and agricultural self-
sufficiency in East Asia and Africa would rise two to three points, in South Asia it would be 
unchanged, and in Latin America it would jump from 112 to 126 percent (not shown in Table 
7). Those effects are very similar regardless of whether the DAI or GTAP database is used, 
except for plant-based fibers because the DAI database includes some distortions to the US 
cotton market that were not included in the GTAP database.  
[insert Table 7 about here] 
Even though self-sufficiency does not alter much in aggregate, such reform would 
raise substantially the global share of various agricultural and food production exported. This 
is especially so for highly protected sugar and milk. In developing countries it is also the case 
for grains, oilseeds and meat: the share of their grain production that is exported would 
double, and for meat it would more than double. For sugar it would rise nearly four-fold, 
reflecting the fact that sugar, together with rice, is the most protected farm product globally 
(followed by milk and beef – see Croser, Lloyd and Anderson 2010).  
 
2.3.4 Effects on product prices 
 
                                                          
21 Note that Argentina’s estimated farm output and exports increase far more using the DAI database than using 
the GTAP one, indicating just how much its current export taxes discourage the farm sector of that country. 
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The average real international prices of agricultural and lightly processed food products 
would be no more than 1 percent different in the absence of all merchandise trade distortions 
(Table 8: the model’s numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' 
manufactured exports). This again reflects the fact that the pro-agricultural policies of high-
income countries are almost fully offset by the output reducing effect of the anti-agricultural 
policies of developing countries The effects vary considerably across products though, as 
well as differing as between the two databases. Current policies are especially dampening the 
international prices of beef, milk, rice and cotton – again because they are the most distorted 
product markets globally (Croser, Lloyd and Anderson 2010).  
[insert Table 8 about here] 
 
2.3.5 Effects on sectoral value added 
 
Of crucial interest in terms of these policies’ impact on inequality and poverty is how they 
affect value added in agriculture versus other sectors. In the case of countries where 
agriculture is mostly family farming with no hired help, no mortgage and no off-farm income, 
the former is the same as farm household income, while in other cases it can be thought of as 
net farm income before wages and interest are deducted. The DAI results reported in the first 
two columns of Table 9 show the effects of full global reform of just agricultural and food 
policies, while the second pair reports the effects when all merchandise trade policies are 
removed. They reveal not only that most of the effect on agriculture comes from agricultural 
policies, but also that when non-farm policies also are removed the impact on both farm and 
non-farm value added is not a lot different. This again underscores the point made earlier that 
the most distortive policies are in agriculture.  
[insert Table 9 about here] 
More specifically, the results show that for high-income countries, value added in 
agriculture would fall by about one-seventh if agricultural distortions were removed globally. 
For developing countries as a group, value added in agriculture is estimated to rise by 5.6 
percent according to the DAI database (or 3.5 percent using the GTAP database), compared 
with under 2 percent for non-agriculture, following full global reform of all merchandise 
trade. Latin America is where net farm income expands most, averaging more than 30 percent 
and, according to the DAI database, exceeding 100 percent for Argentina and Ecuador and 
40-50 percent for Brazil and Colombia. In East Asia it also expands, and more than non-
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agricultural value added, according to the DAI database. This is not the case with the GTAP 
database though, the difference being because that database overstates the import protection 
in China and India (see Table 1). Not surprisingly given the high levels of subsidies and 
import protection for Indian farmers shown in Table 1, net farm incomes are estimated to fall 
in South Asia according to both databases (by up to 9 percent) – but textiles and clothing 
would expand there and, in India where the skilled/unskilled wage differential rises, so too 
would skill-intensive goods and services production.  
 
2.3.6 Effects on poverty using the elasticities approach 
 
The above results for net farm income suggest both inequality and poverty could be alleviated 
globally by agricultural and trade policy liberalization. It is possible to go a step further in 
assessing reform impacts on poverty with a global model, even with only one single 
representative household per country. That involves using the elasticities approach. It 
involves taking the impact on real household income, applying an estimated income to 
poverty elasticity, and then assessing the impacts on the poverty headcount index for each 
country. The simple approach would assume distributional neutrality: the poor receive the 
same proportional increase in real income as the average household in the economy, and all 
are subject to the same higher rate of direct income taxation to replace the customs revenue 
forgone because of trade liberalization. A slightly more complex but more reasonable 
approach is to link key model variables to the possible change in the average per capita 
consumption of the poor, that is, to capture from the model’s results some of the 
distributional aspects of the changes in real income, rather than simply the average gain. This 
is done here by calculating the change in the (pre-tax) average wage of unskilled workers 
deflated by the food and clothing CPI—presumably the most relevant consumer prices for the 
poor, including those many poorest of farm and other rural households that earn most of their 
income from wages and are net buyers of food. These workers are assumed to be exempt 
from the direct income tax imposed to replace the lost customs revenue following trade 
reform—a realistic assumption for many developing countries.22
Table 10 summarizes the key poverty results using this approach. According to the 
DAI database, under the full merchandise trade reform scenario, extreme poverty (the number 
  
                                                          
22 Even if the fiscal closure affects a domestic sales or value added tax instead of direct taxes on households, in 
many countries food is exempt from taxation, or the tax on food is difficult to collect in practice because of the 
informal nature of many food markets. 
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of people surviving on less than US$1 a day) in developing countries would drop by 26 
million relative to the baseline level of just under one billion, a reduction of 2.7 percent. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa the number of extreme poor would fall by 3.7 percent. In India (though 
not in the rest of South Asia), by contrast, the number of extreme poor is estimated to rise, by 
4.0 percent. Under the broader definition of poverty—those living on no more than US$2 per 
day—the number of poor in developing countries would fall by 87 million under the full 
reform scenario compared to an aggregate baseline level of nearly 2.5 billion. This represents 
a somewhat larger proportionate reduction in the number of poor in developing countries, of 
3.4 percent, or 3.7 percent if China is excluded. The proportionate decline in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is 2.7 percent, while for India there is still an increase, of 1.7 percent. These changes 
in the number of poor as a results of trade liberalization are slightly lower than those obtained 
using the GTAP database (compare parts (b) and (c) of Table 10). 
[insert Table 10 about here] 
 
 
3. The concern with the counterfactual 
 
The fact that 2004 is the latest year for which a global production, trade and protection 
database is available is of some concern because the world economy is continually growing 
and structurally adjusting, and because policies continue to change over time. One way of 
dealing with this is to first project the global ecconomy forward to create a new baseline 
against which to compare alternative scenarios. Key issues associated with such projections 
are the subject of the companion chapter in this Handbook by van der Mensbrugghe (2012). 
An important additional issue is: what counterfactual policy regime is to be assumed for that 
projected baseline year? Typically analysts assume the status quo, that is, that policies as in 
the 2004 baseline will remain in place. Yet there is very clear evidence of systematic 
differences across countries with different per capita income levels and comparative 
advantages, as well as over time as countries grow, and especially so in the case of 
agriculture (Anderson 2010b).  
In recent years there has been renewed interest in projecting global commodity 
markets and the overall economy two or more decades ahead. Demand for such long-term 
projections has been driven by such things as the recent rises in food and energy prices, rapid 
growth in large emerging economies, and worries about greenhouse gas emissions and policy 
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responses to them. Such projections are also sought by trade policy analysts as a baseline for 
estimating the effects of proposed or alternative trade policy reforms that tend to be phased in 
over anything up to two decades. One such proposal is the Doha Development Agenda of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). There are also numerous regional and other plurilateral 
economic integration proposals under discussion, including a Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
The most-common assumption in developing baseline projections is that trade-related 
policies do not change over the projection period. That may be reasonable for manufacturing 
protectionism, now that most major countries have liberalized most of their markets for 
industrial products. Agricultural policies, however, continue to be highly distorting – and 
they have been evolving in fairly systematic ways. How different might farm policies be in, 
say, 2030 from those in 2004 (the base year of the latest GTAP protection database) in the 
absense of a Doha agreement to undertake multilateral policy reform and any other 
plurilateral trade agreements? 
This section addresses that question by drawing on the World Bank’s distortions to 
agricultural incentives (DAI) database described in Section 2 above, political economy 
theory, a set of political econometric equations for the most important agricultural products, 
and knowledge of current WTO-bound tariffs. With those equations plus projections of 
pertinent variables from recent economywide modeling, agricultural price distortion rates are 
generated for the world in 2030. This provides an alternative to the common ‘business-as-
usual’ projections approach of assuming the status quo will prevail on the policy front, 
allowing us to explore the extent to which results differ depending on the chosen 
counterfactual against which future trade-liberalizing scenarios are compared. 
We begin with a brief summary of the post-World War II history of distortions to 
agricultural (relative to industrial) incentives globally. We then draw on political economy 
theory and institutional history to propose a set of political econometric equations for the 
most important agricultural products, aimed at providing a means of projecting future 
agricultural distortions for any country in the absense of further trade reform,23
                                                          
23 This draws on Anderson and Nelgen (2011). Bouët and Laborde (2010) also seek to assess the implications 
for the world economy of protection growth that might result if the WTO’s Doha round fails to agree to 
liberalize trade multilaterally. However, their assumed alternative protection rates are more ad hoc than those 
used here. 
 before 
presenting the econometric results. Section 3.4 shows how different the welfare effects of 
trade-distorting policies are when these alternative price distortions are inserted into a global 
economywide model instead of just assuming the 2004 DAI distortion rates remain 
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unchanged. The key finding is that the contribution of farm policies to the estimated welfare 
cost of trade-distorting policies by 2030 is considerably higher – especially for developing 
countries – than if one assumes no change in farm policies over the next two decades.  
 
3.1 Brief history of distortions to agricultural incentives  
 
Some agricultural and other trade policy developments over the past half century or so have 
happened quite suddenly, been unpredicted, and been transformational, but most have been 
more gradual. For decades, agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and some 
middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm products. The 
Haberler (1958) report to GATT Contracting Parties forewarned that such distortions might 
worsen, and indeed they did between the 1950s and the early 1980s (Anderson, Hayami and 
Others 1986). Meanwhile, the governments of many developing countries directly taxed their 
farmers, overvalued their currency, and pursued import-substituting industrialization by 
restricting imports of manufactures. Together, those measures strongly discouraged 
agricultural production in developing countries (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988, 1991). 
Since the 1980s those disincentives have been easing, however, as revealed in the new 
database of agricultural distortions over the past half-century compiled recently by the World 
Bank (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). That database indicates the extent to which 
government-imposed distortions created a gap between domestic producer prices and what 
they would be under free markets, known as the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA).24
Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the 
years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different 
groups of covered tradable farm products. Also generated is a production-weighted average 
NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 
calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), defined in percentage terms as: 
 Since 
the 1980s, some high-income country governments have also provided so-called ‘decoupled’ 
assistance to farmers. Because that support in principle does not distort resource allocation 
like direct price supports, its NRA has been computed separately and is not included for 
comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for developing countries.  
                                                          
24 Also calculated is a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE), which is equal to the NRA if and only if no domestic 
producer or consumer measures also are in place.  
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where NRAagt and NRAnonagt are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the 
agricultural (including noncovered) and nonagricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA 
cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since 
the weighted average NRAnonagt is non-negative in all the country case studies). And if both 
of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero.  
Historically, national nominal rates of assistance to agriculture (NRAs) have tended to 
be higher, the higher a country’s income per capita and the weaker a country’s agricultural 
comparative advantage. There has also been a (somewhat weaker) tendency since the 1960s 
for manufacturing protection to be lower, the higher a country’s income per capita and the 
stronger a country’s manufacturing comparative advantage. Together these tendencies would 
expect one to observe the relative rate of assistance to farmers (RRA) to be positively 
correlated with per capita income and negatively correlated with an index of comparative 
advantage in farm products. This is indeed what the DAI database reveals (Figure 1). 
Figure 2 shows the RRA has been rising over time for developing countries as a group, and 
also for high-income countries prior to the 1990s. The developing countries’ RRA rose from 
around -50 percent in the latter 1960s to almost zero in 2000-04, while the RRA for high-
income countries rose from 14 percent in the latter 1950s to a peak of just above 50 percent in 
the late 1980s. A movement in the RRA towards (away from) zero might indicate an 
improvement (worsening) in economic welfare, suggesting that the welfare cost of 
developing country policies may have been falling but may begin increasing if they follow 
the high-income countries’ earlier example in raising their now-positive average RRA 
further. That is certainly what Korea and Taiwan did in following Japan, and China, India and 
other developing countries appear to be on a similar trajectory (Anderson 2009b). 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 A disaggregation of the NRA estimate for the agricultural sector into the NRAs for 
the export and import-competing sub-sectors, as in Figure 3, reveals that developing country 
exporters of farm products faced a tax of around 50 percent on average in the first decades of 
post-colonial government; but that average rate of taxation has gradually fallen to almost zero 
since the mid-1980s. Meanwhile, however, the NRA for import-competing farmers in 
developing countries has been positive and steadily rising throughout this period (apart from 
a spike in the mid-1980s when international prices fell to a near-record low as a consequence 
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of a farm export subsidy war between the two sides of the North Atlantic). The trend for 
exporters could have reduced the welfare cost of agricultural distortions in developing 
countries, but the fact that import-competing farmers were increasingly assisted reduces that 
possibility. As for high-income countries, Figure 3(b) shows that their exporters received 
rising support until the end of the North Atlantic farm export subsidy war, but that import-
competing farmers enjoyed higher and faster-rising support over that period than exporters.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
3.2 What determines the evolution of NRAs over time? 
 
Political economy theory to explain the pattern of agricultural distortions across countries and 
over time made some progress in the 1980s, but then it stalled. Only now are theorists 
beginning again to focus on improving our conceptualization of the issue, suggest 
hypotheses, compile appropriate data, and use political econometrics to test those hypotheses 
(see, e.g., Anderson 2010b; Anderson adn Nelgen 2011; Rausser, Swinnen and Zusman 2011; 
Anderson, Rausser and Swinnen 2012). But even the earlier analysis can take us some way 
towards understanding the evolution of agricultural price-distorting policies. Anderson 
(1995), for example, suggests the following factors distinguish the domestic polities of 
developing and high-income countries.  
First, in a poor agrarian economy (PAE), urban wage-earners and hence their 
employers care a great deal about the price of food, and are relatively well organized. 
Farmers by contrast, are numerous but poorly organized, and many are so small as to be able 
to sell only a little or none of their output in the market. In a rich industrial economy (RIE), 
by contrast, farm products (especially net of post-farmgate costs) represent a small fraction of 
urban household expenditure and hence of real wages. As well, urban households are far 
more numerous and so suffer from a free-rider problem of collective action in RIEs, just as 
farmers do in PAEs. 
 Secondly, a typical PAE has the majority of its workforce employed in agricultural 
pursuits and relatively few in manufacturing, whereas in RIEs there could be up to ten times 
as many engaged in industrial jobs as on farms. Altering the domestic price of farm relative 
to industrial products thus has a far bigger impact on the price of mobile labor in a PAE than 
in a RIE. Industrial capitalists therefore are more likely to be able to lobby successfully for 
(and governments face less opposition to) taxes on agricultural exports and on imports of 
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manufactured goods in PAEs, whereas agricultural interests are more likely to be able to 
lobby successfully for (and governments face less opposition to) agricultural subsidies and 
import tariffs in RIEs. 
 Thirdly, high costs of collecting taxes other than at the border in PAEs make them 
much more likely than RIEs to employ trade taxes and thus be prone to an anti-trade bias in 
their sectoral policies, and high costs of dispersing funds make PAEs less fiscally capable of 
subsidizing any sector. By definition the PAE has a comparative advantage in agricultural 
goods, hence this anti-trade bias adds to the anti-agricultural bias in PAE policies.  
Together these forces lead one to expect to observe countries gradually switching 
from a negative to a positive RRA as their per capita income grows, and more so if their 
agricultural comparative declines in the process of that development. That is consistent with 
the evidence presented in Figure 1 above. It is also consistent with a formal econometric test 
using those two variables for the full sample of countries in the Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008) panel dataset, as well as separately for each of the three developing country regions 
and for high-income countries (Anderson 2010b, Table 2.12). 
The domestic polity also can come under pressure from outside from time to time. 
Three sets of external forces during the past quarter-century are worth mentioning. One is the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, negotiations for which began in 1986 and 
implementation of which concluded in 2004. That led to agreements to convert non-tariff 
barriers to tariffs, to set caps (bindings) on those tariffs, and to phase down and cap domestic 
and export subsidies. 25 The caps were somewhat above applied rates in high-income 
countries, but they were very much above applied tariffs in the case of middle- and especially 
low-income countries. Hence those bindings currently provide little discipline on the 
agricultural policies of most developing countries.26
A second and complementary force in Europe was the likelihood and then reality of 
an eastern enlargement of the European Union, which required the budget for subsidies under 
the Common Agricultural Policy gradually to be spread over a dozen more countries. One 
consequence was a move away from price-support instruments to more-decoupled measures 
  
                                                          
25 A further consequence of the Uruguay Round was that it contributed to the unilateral decisions in Australia 
and New Zealand to phase out most of their agricultural assistance, although the main political drivers there 
were domestic and they led to even larger cuts to what had been high rates of manufacturing protection. Hence 
the (negative) RRA in those countries rose to zero, just as happened in developing countries (Anderson, Lloyd 
and MacLaren 2007). 
26 They are still valuable in limiting the scope for countries to raise tariffs when international food prices spike 
downwards though (Francois and Martin 2004) – as they have tended to do in the past, thereby accentuating the 
fall in the international price (Anderson and Nelgen 2011). 
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including single farm payments. The reforms came in various stages, under McSharry in 
1992 and under Fischler in the early 2000s (Swinnen 2008), which explains much of the 
gradual fall in EU and hence high-income agricultural NRAs after the late 1980s (Figure 
3(b)). For intra-EU political and budgetary reasons they are unlikely to trend back upwards in 
the foreseeable future. 
The third external force came from international financial institutions whose loans 
and other assistance to developing countries became somewhat conditional on better 
economic governance including more openness of their economies. That helped to bring 
down their NRAs for non-farm tradable sectors (Figure 2(a)) and to phase out their taxes on 
farm exports (Figure 3(a)). However, with so little discipline on farm import tariffs coming 
from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, those tariffs have continued to drift 
upwards for developing countries over the past two decades.27
 The above suggests high-income countries (including Eastern Europe’s transition 
economies that are now part of the European Union) are unlikely in the foreseeable future to 
raise their assistance to farmers via price-distorting measures, developing countries are 
unlikely to return to farm export taxation (apart from temporarily at times of price spikes), 
and all countries are unlikely to return to high levels of protection for the manufacturing 
sector. But if the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda fails to conclude with an agreement to 
greatly reduce developing countries’ bindings on agricultural import tariffs, political 
economy theory and past experience suggest their agricultural protection growth may well 
continue. More specifically, such protection increases could be expected to be related to 
growth in per capita income and in agricultural comparative disadvantage, and to be higher 
for import-competing than exported farm products. According to the econometric evidence 
reported in Anderson (2010a, Table 2.12), an equation worth considering for projecting each 
country’s tradable food products is the following: 
 It also means it has been 
difficult for the WTO membership to demand tight constraints on out-of-quota farm tariffs of 
countries seeking to accede to the WTO. This is the case even for China, where strong 
pressure resulted in low tariffs only on in-quota volumes of imports.    
(2)  ( , , )i iNRA f YPC LPC TSI=  
                                                          
27 There are virtually no effective WTO disciplines on export taxes though. Some developing countries have 
chosen to use that freedom to impose export taxes (and lower import taxes) temporarily when international food 
price spike upwards, so as to not transmit all of such price spikes to their domestic food market. As already 
mentioned, the gap between their applied and bound import tariff also gives them latitude to raise applied rates 
when international prices fall, so as to protect their farmers from that slump. Evidence of extensive use of these 
freedoms is provided by Anderson and Nelgen (2011).  
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where YPC is the log of real per capita national income, LPC is the log of arable land per 
capita (an indicator of agricultural comparative advantage), and TSIi is a trade specialization 
index for product i (exports minus imports as a fraction of exports plus imports of i) which, 
by definition, ranges between minus and plus one.  
 
3.3 Projecting developing country NRAs from 2004 to 2030 
 
Modelers wishing to estimate the likely effects of a future structural or policy shock need first 
to project a baseline of the global economy to a target future date such as 2030 in the absence 
of that shock. This can then serve as the counterfactual against which to compare the 
economy in that year in the presence of the shock of interest (e.g., the implementation of a 
multilateral trade agreement such as that being sought under the WTO’s Doha Development 
Agenda). 
 Typically modelers assume for their baseline that trade-related policies remain 
unchanged over the projection period. The purpose of this section is to explore how the 
results for 2030 under that assumption differ from those based on an alternative 
counterfactual. The alternative considered here draws on estimates of Equation (2) for ten key 
traded farm products as of 2004. Projections of NRAs for each of those products in 2030 for 
each of the main developing countries (the 39 in the World Bank DAI database) are then 
generated using model-based projections of the exogenous variables on the right-hand siide 
of Equation (2). 
The sample for the regression equation is all 75 countries in the World Bank 
distortion database in 2004. The estimated regression equations are reported for each product 
in Table 11. The results are not highly significant, but apart from maize at least one of the 3 
explanatory variables is statistically significant in each equation. (The insignificant result for 
maize is not surprising in view of the very small range of its NRAs in the panel data set.) For 
the other nine products, the R2 values are between 0.21 and 0.55. All product equations have 
a positive coefficient for YPC and a negative coefficient for LPC, as predicted by theory. All 
except the soybean equation have a negative coefficient for TSI, again consistent with the 
above theory.  
[insert Table 11 about here] 
To use these equations to project NRAs, it is necessary to have projected values for 
the three exogenous variables. These are taken from a recent exercise that employs the GTAP 
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economy-wide model (and database, except for altering the developing country agricultural 
distortions to match the DAI estimates) to project the world economy to 2030 (Anderson and 
Strutt 2011). That projection assumes the 2004 trade-related policies of each country do not 
change over that 26-year period but that national real GDP, population, unskilled and skilled 
labor, capital, agricultural land and other natural resources (oil, gas, coal and other minerals) 
grow at exogenously set rates. Those exogenous growth rates are based on ADB, OECD, 
USDA and World Bank projections, plus historical trends in mineral and energy raw material 
reserves. Given those exogenous growth rates, the model is able to derive implied rates of 
growth in total factor productivity and GDP per capita. For any one country the rate of total 
factor productivity growth is assumed to be the same in each of its non-primary sectors, and 
to be somewhat higher in its primary sectors. Higher productivity growth rates for primary 
activities were characteristic of the latter half of the 20th century (Martin and Mitra 2001), 
and are necessary in this projection if real international prices of primary products (relative to 
the aggregate change for all products) are to rise only modestly to 2030.28
In addition to taking the real GDP, land and population values for 2030 from the 
Anderson and Strutt (2011) study, we also use its estimated trade structure for 2030 to 
estimate a value for TSI for each product and country. That provides all the exogenous 
variables needed to estimate a potential endogenous value for the NRA for each product and 
country. That estimated value is then subjected to the following series of tests. First, if a farm 
product was exported in 2004 and is projected still to be a net export product in 2030 
(TSI>0), then its 2030 NRA is assumed to be the lesser of its 2004 NRA or zero. That is, all 
export taxes are assumed to be phased out by 2030, and no new export subsidies are 
introduced. And second, if it is projected to be an import-competing product in 2030 (TSI<0), 
then its 2030 NRA is assumed to be the lesser of the equation’s projected NRA or its WTO-
bound tariff rate. That is, all developing country governments are assumed to respect their 
commitment to WTO to not exceed their tariff bindings but otherwise they are assumed to 
 Once those higher 
TFP growth rates for primary sectors are determined, the uniform rates for non-primary 
sectors are re-calculated to ensure the targeted GDP levels are obtained.  
                                                          
28 That calibration is consistent with the World Bank’s projections over the coming decades (see van der 
Mensbrugghe and Roson 2010, and van der Mensbrugghe 2012). An alternative in which agricultural prices fall 
is considered unlikely over the next two decades, given the slowdown in agricultural R&D investment since 
1990 and its consequent delayed slowing of farm productivity growth (Alston, Babcock and Pardey 2010). It is 
even less likely for farm products if fossil fuel prices and biofuel mandates in the US, EU and elsewhere are 
maintained over the next decade. Another alternative is that real international primary product prices will rise 
over coming decades, in which case assistance to farmers might be less everywhere than suggested below. 
Neither of these alternatives are considered here, but they could be worthy of subsequent analysis. 
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respond to domestic political forces in determining the degree of protection provided to 
import-competing farm industries. 
Using this methodology and set of selection criteria, projected values for each of the 
ten products and for each of the 39 developing countries in the World Bank sample are 
calculated. Their averages across countries for each region and across products for each 
country are reported in Tables 12 and 13, respectively.  
[insert Tables 12 and 13 about here] 
What do those estimates reveal? For developing countries as a whole, the average 
NRA for these products is projected to rise from 7 percent in 2004 to 35 percent by 2030. It 
happens that 35 percent is the 2004 average for high-income countries (including Europe’s 
transition economies). Since we assume the NRAs for the latter countries do not change over 
the projection period, it means the NRA for these ten products for the world as a whole is 
projected to rise, from 20 percent in 2004 to 35 percent by 2030, other things equal. As 
shown in Table 13(b), the biggest increase is in developing Asia, where the average NRA 
rises from 11 to 42 percent over the projection period, followed by Africa (a rise from -9 to 
16 percent) and Latin America (a rise from -1 to 17 percent). The biggest projected NRA 
rises are in rice and sugar, which is not surprising since they are the most distorted products 
in high-income countries (see bottom of Table 12). 
For farm products other than these ten major ones, and for highly processed food and 
other merchandise, developing country import protection rates in 2030 are assumed to be the 
same as in 2004, and any agricultural export taxes in 2004 are assumed to be eliminated by 
2030.  
 
3.4 Projecting the cost of trade-distorting policies as of 2030 
 
What would those projected NRAs imply about the cost of agricultural and other price- and 
trade-distorting policies in the world economy in 2030, compared with assuming no changes 
in trade policies since 2004? That question can be answered by comparing results from two 
global trade liberalization simulations with a global economy-wide model that has been 
projected to 2030. The first experiment assumes those 2004 distortions remain unchanged 
over the projection period, while the second assumes those 2004 distortions changed in ways 
described in the previous section for developing countries but that tariffs in high-income 
countries stay the same as in 2004. Such an exercise has been undertaken recently by 
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Anderson and Strutt (2011). Their 2030 import tariffs for the first simulation are shown in the 
first three columns of Table 14, while their average tariffs for all of agriculture and processed 
food for the second simulation are shown in the final column of Table 14. 
[insert Table 14 about here] 
Anderson and Strutt (2011) use the standard GTAP Model of the world economy 
(Hertel 1997) and its Version 7.1 database for 2004. They aggregate the model to 33 
countries/country groups and 26 sector/product groups, and then project the global economy 
to 2030 by first assuming no policy changes and then assuming the above-described 
agricultural protection growth in developing countries. Welfare results from those two 
simulations are summarized in Tables 15 and 16.  
[insert Tables 15 and 16 about here] 
Table 15 shows the distribution of the gains that would come from full global 
liberalization of all merchandise trade as of 2030. A comparison of parts (a) and (b) of that 
table suggest, unsurprisingly, that the global welfare cost of trade policies would be 
somewhat higher with that agricultural protection growth. In particular, the welfare cost of 
developing countries’ agricultural policies would be more than one-quarter higher, increasing 
the cost of their policies overall by one-ninth – and raising agriculture’s contribution to the 
global cost of all goods trade distortions by two percentage points.  
Table 16 disaggregates those results to reveal their effects on major economies. The 
differences in the two sets of effects are a combination of higher protection rates and thus 
also consumer prices for some farm products in some developing countries, substitution 
towards the production and away from the consumption of those more-protected products in 
those countries, and, as a consequence of those adjustments, terms of trade changes for all 
countries. For most but not all of the countries/country groups shown in Table 16, their 
welfare would be lower (their gain from liberalization greater) in the scenario in which 
agricultural protection was greater. The exceptions are food-importing Japan, China and Rest 
of South Asia, all of whom would have benefitted from the lower international prices 
associated with higher agricultural protection and thus would suffer a greater terms of trade 
deterioration with reform.  
The above analysis suggests the common assumption in developing baseline 
projections for the world economy, namely that trade-related policies do not change over a 
projection period as long as a quarter-century, may lead to underestimation of the gains from 
the phased implementation of prospective trade agreements. Had Japan and Korea been 
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required to bind their agricultural tariffs at the rates in place when they signed onto the GATT 
in 1955 and 1967 respectively, estimates of the economic benefits of their membership of that 
club would have differed greatly had it been assumed their farm tariffs would remain 
unchanged over the following quarter-century rather than rise – as indeed they did, and 
spectacularly so (Anderson 2009b). 
 
 
4. The concern with tariff aggregation 
 
Protection rates—and many other economic distortions -- vary enormously across 
commodities in almost every country. These variations in rates of tariff protection raise the 
cost of any given ‘average’ level of protection, since the cost of protection increases with the 
square of the protection rate. Some degree of aggregation is essential because the available 
information on the structure of production and consumption is at a higher level of aggregation 
than information on tariffs and trade. Additional aggregation typically is undertaken to ease 
computational and reporting constraints for the modeler.  
The usual approach to aggregation is to get weighted averages of tariffs, using as 
weights the value of external trade. This atheoretical approach is problematic because, as a 
protection rate rises, the weight associated with that measure declines – to the point that a 
tariff that completely blocks trade has the same measured impact as a zero tariff. The Overall 
Trade Restrictiveness Index approach used by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009, equation 16) 
deals with these problems by adding estimates of own-price elasticities as well as import 
weights, and by taking the square of the tariff to reflect the fact that the costs of a tariff rise 
with its square. If one makes the assumption that the off-diagonal elements of the matrix of 
trade elasticities are zero, this results in the following estimating equation:  
(3)     OTRI = �∑𝑚𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑇𝑖2
∑𝑚𝑖 𝑠𝑖 �
1
2
 
where mi is the compensated elasticity of import demand for good i, si is the share of the good 
at world prices and Ti  is the tariff on the good.  
This approach is unfortunately not suited to the problem of aggregation within a trade 
model. A fundamental difference between this approach and one suited to aggregation in a 
general equilibrium model is that different parts of the model require different approaches to 
aggregation. When aggregating tariffs for use within an expenditure function, and hence the 
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volume of imports which is derived by differentiating this function with respect to prices, 
tariffs should, intuitively, enter the aggregation function linearly, as noted by Lloyd, Croser 
and Anderson (2010). By contrast, when aggregating tariffs to assess the impacts of tariff 
changes on tariff revenues or welfare, the tariff change is likely to enter nonlinearly as in the 
OTRI defined above. Another concern with the conventional OTRI approach is the 
assumption that the off-diagonal elasticities of import demand are zero. Since the import 
demand elasticities underlying this function are compensated, the sum of these cross 
elasticities is, by homogeneity of degree one in prices, equal and opposite to the own-price 
elasticity. The fact that the elasticity terms being omitted are equal to and opposite in sign to 
the terms used in the OTRI raises concerns about the omission of these terms, particularly in 
countries where the share of trade in GDP is large.  
Anderson and Neary (1994) propose a uniform tariff that yields the same welfare as 
the original differentiated tariff structure. In subsequent work they develop uniform tariff 
measures that are equivalent in their effects on the value of imports (Anderson and Neary 
1996). The unifying feature of these aggregators is that they return the uniform tariff rate that 
yields the same value of a specific objective function as the actual, non-uniform tariff 
structure. 
Building on the Anderson-Neary approach, Bach and Martin (2001) proposed an 
approach to aggregation in the context of structural economic models that mitigates many of 
the problems resulting from use of atheoretical aggregators—and show that the implications 
of aggregation could be large for specific countries. Martin, van der Mensbrugghe and 
Manole (2003) apply this methodology to additional countries and confirm that the impact on 
the results could be substantial. Manole and Martin (2005) develop the approach further, 
showing that it should be applied in specific ways, and establish relationships between 
different tariff indexes. A new aggregation method proposed by Anderson (2009) deals with 
both the aggregation bias and weighting problems, and maintains global payment balances, 
allowing it to be applied in global models. Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2011) 
apply that aggregation approach to ex ante assessment of global economic reforms, 
demonstrating that it is feasible and examining some of the key issues involved in applying it 
in a global general equilibrium model. 
The effects of aggregation may also depend upon the nature of the reform considered. 
If the reform involves widely disparate cuts in protection rates, then it seems likely that the 
approach used for aggregation will be doubly important. To illustrate this point, we draw on 
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the analysis of Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2012) who examine the impacts 
of the complex and exception-ridden Doha Development Agenda proposals from December 
2008 (WTO 2008a, b).   
In order to understand the logic of the aggregation approach, it is useful to begin with a 
simple case where there is only one distortion, say an import tariff. The essential difference 
between the new estimates and traditional trade-weighted averages is that the optimal 
aggregators take into account the fact that the quantity of a good imported subject to a tariff 
depends on the level of the tariff, with higher tariff rates resulting in a lower import volume. 
Including these changes in quantity weights has two important consequences. The first is that 
a tariff reduction of a given size on a particular product has a larger impact on the cost of 
imports and on partners’ export opportunities in later stages of liberalization, that is, after the 
tariff has been reduced substantially and its weight in the expenditure cost index has 
increased. The second is that the impacts of a tariff cut on tariff revenues may be quite 
different than would be suggested when using a fixed weight – a difference that is largest in 
the early stages of liberalization, when tariffs are at their highest levels and increases in 
import volumes have their largest impact on tariff revenues. 
Figure 4 helps to understand both of these effects. In this diagram, we consider a 
single tariff considered in the absence of any other distortions. This tariff is initially t0, and 
the initial quantity of imports, x0. If we consider a reform that progressively reduces this 
tariff, the quantity of the good imported rises as we move along the line labelled x. When the 
tariff reaches zero, the weight on this good in the import-cost index becomes x1 under the 
optimal expenditure aggregator. When we consider large cuts in tariffs, the difference 
between a weight of x0 and x1 may have important impacts on the estimated effects of a tariff 
change on the cost of living or on partners’ market access. If we use the traditional fixed-
weight approach, the weight may stay at a very low level, suggesting that even a large tariff 
change has little impact on the cost of living. This effect is clearly important for reforms that 
involve large tariff reductions on products whose tariffs are initially very high and hence have 
very low quantities of imports. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
The marginal impact of a tariff decline on tariff revenues may be quite different from 
that on the cost of imported goods. While x0 gives the marginal impact of a change in the 
tariff on the cost of imported goods, the impact on tariff revenues depends also on the change 
in the quantity of the good and on the initial tariff rate on that good. In the diagram, this is 
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shown by x0 + t0dx/dt. As the tariff declines further, the marginal effect of a reduction in the 
tariff on tariff revenues is shown by the dashed line. When the tariff is high, a tariff cut may – 
as drawn – increase tariff revenues because we start from a point beyond the peak revenues 
for this tariff.29
The Anderson-Neary approach to tariff aggregation begins with a representation of 
the economy provided by the following two equations: 
 As the tariff reduction proceeds, the incremental increases in tariff revenues 
decline, and turn into revenue declines where the dashed line crosses the horizontal axis. 
After the dashed line crosses the horizontal line corresponding to the initial level of imports, 
x0, the tariff revenue aggregator shows a larger reduction in tariff revenues than the fixed-
weight index, despite allowing for the increases in import volumes associated with tariff 
declines. The marginal decline in tariff revenues remains below the decline in required 
expenditure until the tariff reaches zero, and the impact of a tariff reduction on tariff revenues 
is the same as its impact on the cost of the good.  
the income-expenditure condition, 
(4) e(p, u) - r(p, v) - (ep  - rp  )(p - pw) -  f =  0 
and the vector of  behavioral equations, 
(5) ep (p, u) - rp(p, v) = m 
In the income-expenditure condition, e  is the expenditure required to achieve consumer 
utility level u at domestic price vector p; r is the revenue function (also named the restricted 
profit function or GDP function) at domestic prices p attainable with the given resource 
vector v; ep - rp is the vector of net imports/exports at world prices pw and domestic prices p, 
so that (ep - rp)(p - pw)  represents net revenue from tariffs and export taxes/subsidies; and f is 
the net financial inflow from abroad needed to finance the gap between income and 
expenditure required to achieve utility level u. If f is exogenously-determined, then u is 
endogenous and vice versa. In the behavioral equations, m is a vector of net imports, 
including non-traded goods (for which m ≡ 0) and supplied and demanded factors. 
The balance-of-trade function (Anderson and Neary 1996) can be derived from 
equation (4) by reclassifying both the level of utility and f as exogenous, and introducing a 
new endogenous variable, B, to measure the hypothetical financial inflow required to 
                                                          
29 This case is likely to be common given the protectionist motivation of much protection, the relatively high 
estimated values of the elasticity of substitution between products at fine levels, and the high and widely-
dispersed patterns of tariff rates frequently observed. 
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maintain a specified level of utility, say u0, in the face of an exogenous shock such as a 
change in the tariff vector, (p - pw), or a change in world prices, pw: 
(6) B(p, u0) =   e(p, u0) - r(p, v) - (ep  - rp  )(p - pw)  -  f  
The balance-of-trade function gives us the transfer required to maintain the same level of 
utility given a change in prices, and is therefore a convenient measure of the compensation 
required to maintain national welfare at any specified level. Its use can be seen as a 
generalization of the use of the expenditure function to provide a money measure of the 
impact on consumers of price changes. 
The Anderson-Neary Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) is the uniform tariff rate, τB, 
which satisfies: 
(7) B(pw(1+τB), u0 ) = B(p, u0) 
where the two price vectors being compared are the original vector of domestic prices 
associated with the non-uniform tariffs, p, and the vector of prices resulting from multiplying 
the vector of world prices, pw , by the scalar (1+τB).  
While much better than a weighted average as an indicator of the welfare costs of 
existing trade distortions, this TRI measure is not suitable as an aggregator for use in a 
modeling context. For modelling, we need two quite different aggregators—one for the parts 
of the model that involve only the expenditure function, and the quantities that are derived by 
differentiating this function with respect to price, and another for the parts of the model 
involving tariff revenues.   
Bach and Martin (2001) solved this problem by using one tariff aggregator, τe, for the 
expenditure function, as a uniform tariff that returns the same level of expenditure as the 
domestic prices resulting from the original, heterogeneous tariff vector: 
(8) e( pw(1+τe), u0 ) = e(p, u0) 
The tariff revenue aggregator for use in replicating the tariff revenues associated with the 
original, heterogeneous, tariff revenue function is similarly determined as the scalar, τr, that 
satisfies: 
 (9)    tr(pw(1+τr), u0 ) = rj(p, u0) 
where τr is the uniform tariff revenue aggregator and  tr is the tariff revenue function. 
A similar aggregator function can be used for the revenue function r(p, v). This is 
generally not necessary in applied work because the data available on the structure of 
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production are typically much more aggregated than those available for traded goods, and 
export-market distortions are far less widely-used than import barriers.  
By construction, the correct value of B can be obtained by using the tariff aggregates, 
τe and τr . This allows the model to be written in terms of aggregate variables that are 
consistent with the underlying model, rather than with the unmanageable disaggregated tariffs 
or with ad hoc aggregates such as weighted-average tariffs.   
Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2012) use a three-tier strategy to 
implement this approach in the World Bank’s LINKAGE computable general equilibrium 
model of the global economy (van der Mensbrugghe 2005), projected to 2025. They first 
calculate the tariff aggregators for expenditure and tariff revenues using the MacMapHS6 
v2.1 database (Boumellassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna 2009) that provides detailed 
information on bilateral tariffs and trade flows at the HS6 level. The model is modified to 
make a distinction between aggregate quantities computed at domestic and foreign prices 
needed for this type of global analysis (Anderson 2009). For the expenditure aggregators, the 
popular Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form is used to specify the ease 
of substitution between imported goods within the aggregates. By replacing the disparate 
tariffs in each group with the uniform tariff on all imported goods in the group that requires 
the same expenditure as actually observed, a uniform tariff equivalent for expenditures on 
imports is obtained. For the tariff-revenue aggregators, a trade-weighted average is used, with 
the quantities of each good adjusting in a manner consistent with the same CES functional 
form, to obtain the uniform tariff that generates the same tariff revenues. 
In implementing this approach in applied modelling, two other levels of aggregation 
need to be taken into account. The first of these arises from the practical problem that some 
regions in the global model are aggregates covering more than one economy. The second is 
the fact that the six-digit products are likely to include varieties supplied by different 
countries. These challenges are dealt with by using three different levels of nesting in the 
model. At the highest level of aggregation, where there were multiple importing countries in 
an importing region, CES preferences are assumed across importing countries with an 
elasticity of substitution σ0. At the second level of aggregation, CES preferences over the 
HS6 products within the composite goods appearing in the model are assumed. At this stage, 
the HS6 products are aggregates over varieties imported from all supplying regions, with 
elasticity of substitution σ1. At the third level, the Armington approach is used, assuming 
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CES preferences across the six-digit varieties from different exporters. At this stage, an 
elasticity of substitution of σ2 is used between the products provided by different suppliers. 
The relationship between the three levels of product substitution is shown in Figure 5. 
For this analysis, values of three different elasticities of substitution σ0, σ1 and σ2 are needed. 
The value of σ0 is set at 1 in order to hold constant each importer’s share in the value of 
imports, primarily for want of better information; σ1 is the elasticity of substitution between 
imported six-digit products from all sources within a composite good (such as between apples 
and oranges within a composite of vegetables and fruits); and σ2 is determined by the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties of six-digit products supplied by different 
countries/regions. No estimate of exactly σ1 and σ2 are available. However, Hummels and 
Klenow (2005) consider elasticities of substitution between varieties that are differentiated by 
HS six-digit product and by country of origin, concluding that these elasticities generally lie 
between five and ten. To the extent that these elasticities reflect the margins of substitution 
associated with both σ1 and σ2, we might expect them to be greater than our σ1 elasticities of 
substitution but less than our desired estimates for σ2. The analysis is therefore undertaken 
using core values of 1, 2 and 5 for those three key elasticities. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 A sample of results from the analysis is presented in Table 17 for two different global 
reform scenarios in which reforms are phased in over the projection period to 2025. The first 
two columns in this table present results for the benchmark case of full liberalization of all 
merchandise trade. The first of these columns presents the results obtained using the standard 
weighted-average approach to aggregating tariffs; the second presents the results for the same 
experiment when the aggregation problem is allowed for and quantities are allowed to change 
in line with an elasticity of substitution of 2. The second group of results refers to the highly 
disparate set of tariff cuts that would result from implementing the formulas and exceptions 
inherent in the Doha modalities as proposed in WTO (2008a, b). Within this group of three 
columns, the key factor of interest is the differences between the weighted-average 
aggregation approach where the elasticity of substitution is implicitly set to zero (the standard 
weighted-average approach to aggregating tariffs), and the cases with elasticities of 
substitution of 2 and 5.  
[insert Table 17 about here] 
For most countries, moving from the standard trade-weighted averages to optimally-
weighted averages results in larger estimated welfare gains as of 2025 because of the 
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improvements in the measurement of the cost of imports, and of tariff revenues. This increase 
is particularly striking in cases such as China and the United States, where significant 
liberalization is proposed and where market access gains reflect the substantial increases in 
weights as protection in export markets is reduced. There are, however, some interesting 
exceptions to this general pattern. Chile is one such example, where there are few additional 
measured gains using the optimal approach, for two reasons. One is because most of Chile’s 
applied tariffs are uniform, so liberalizing own tariffs has a relatively uniform effect across 
products. The other is that Chile has preferential arrangements with many partners, and the 
aggregation approach reveals a greater sensitivity to preference erosion as the larger weights 
on imports from trading partners with less preferential access are taken into account. In 
aggregate, though, the estimated welfare gain to the world as a whole from either total or 
partial global trade liberalization is far higher when the optimal tariff aggregation procedure 
is used, and more so the larger is the elasticity of substitution. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The above results illustrate how much trade reform modeling results can depend on the 
distortion database used in the analysis. Clearly it is important to choose a database best 
suited for the purpose at hand. If one is interested in trade effects of partial reform of tariff 
protection that might emerge from a preferential trade agreement, for example, then precision 
about bilateral tariff rates will be paramount. Other distortions may affect the welfare 
calculus, but the trade effects will be mostly dependent on just the bilateral tariffs to be 
altered. However, if the main interest is the effect of sectoral policies on domestic output, 
income distribution and national economic welfare, it is crucial to include all important 
distortions to producer incentives, including for other sectors which compete for mobile 
factors of production with the sector in question. That is the point of section 2 of this chapter: 
since agricultural policies are a major remaining source of trade distortions in the world, and 
farming is a major employer in developing countries, those policies need to be as fully 
represented as possible in the model’s distortions database.  
The DAI database suggests price distortions in developing countries were smaller 
than indicated by the applied import tariffs that appear in the GTAP database, one possible 
reason being that imported farm products are not perfect substitutes for domestically 
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produced ‘like’ products and so the price-raising effect in the domestic market is less than the 
full extent of their tariff. According to the Linkage model results, the GTAP database for 
2004 leads to an overestimate by more than 40 percent in the welfare effect on developing 
countries of global trade distortions.The overestimation would have been even larger had it 
not been for the fact that some developing countries still have export taxes in place, which are 
included in the DAI baseline data prior to simulating full liberalization. Hence the gains to 
Latin America are underestimated by 16 percent while those to developing Asia are 
overestimated by 71 percent. Those comparative results also reveal an overestimate for high-
income countries (of about one-seventh), by exaggerating the beneficial terms of trade effect 
to them of developing countries’ agricultural distortions. The contribution that agricultural 
policies make to the welfare effects of all merchandise trade distortions is also exaggerated 
by the GTAP database compared with the DAI one, by about one-tenth globally and one-
quarter for developing countries.  
Second, choosing the appropriate counterfactual set of price distortions in the year of 
concern (such as when a proposed reform is expected to be fully implemented), rather than 
simply assuming no change in policies over the projection period, can make a large 
difference to the estimated welfare effects of a reform program. The case illustrated in 
Section 3 involves agricultural protection growth in rapidly emerging economies should the 
WTO’s Doha Round fail to add disciplines to national agricultual policies of developing 
countries. The gains that would come from full global liberalization of trade as of 2030 are 
somewhat higher with than without that agricultural protection growth. In the case of 
developing countries the estimated cost of their agricultural policies would be higher by one-
quarter in 2030 if their farm protection grew as predicted in Section 3.   
Finally, different methods of aggregating up to the GTAP product groups the price 
distortions (e.g. tariff rates) on individual products can make a large difference to the 
estimated welfare effects of liberalizing a set of trade-distorting tariffs, especially when initial 
tariffs are highly variable and/or the rates of tariff reduction are non-uniform. The differences 
in results reflect differences not just in the welfare impacts resulting from own-reform, but 
also from differences in the extent of market access liberalization by the country or its trading 
partners.  
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Figure 1: RRA mapped on income and agricultural comparative advantage,a 1955 to 2007 
(a) RRA (%) mapped on log of real GDP per capita  
 (b) 
(b) RRA (%) mapped on agricultural comparative advantagea  
 a Defined as agricultural net exports divided by the sum of agricultural exports and imports. 
Source: Anderson (2010a, Figures 2.2 and 2.3)  
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable sectors and 
relative rate of assistance,a developing and high-income countries, 1955 to 2010 
 (percent, farm production-weighted averages across countries) 
(a) Developing countries 
 
 (b) High-income countries 
 
a The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAagt)/(100+NRAnonagt)−1], where NRAagt and 
NRAnonagt are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
Source: Updated from Anderson (2009a, Ch. 1), based on estimates in Anderson and Nelgen 
(2012). 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered 
agricultural products,a high-income, transition and developing countries, 1955 to 2004 
(percent, 5-year weighted averages) 
(a) Developing countries  
 
   (b) High-income countries plus Europe’s transition economies 
 aCovered products only. The total also includes nontradables. The straight line in the 
upper segment of each graph is from an ordinary-least-squares regression based on 
annual NRA estimates for agriculture’s import-competing sub-sector. 
Source: Anderson (2009a, Ch. 1), based on estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Figure 4: Marginal impacts of tariff reductions on expenditure and tariff revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ depiction 
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Figure 5: Three levels of substitution 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ depiction 
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Table 1: Structure of producer price distortions in global goods markets,a 2004  
                                                              
(percent) 
 
 DAI Database GTAP Version 7.0 Database 
 
Primary 
Agriculture 
Agriculture and 
Lightly Processed 
Food 
Other 
goods 
Primary 
Agriculture 
Agriculture and 
Lightly Processed 
Food 
Other 
goods 
Production 
subsidyb 
Export 
subsidyb 
Import 
tax 
Import 
tax 
Production 
subsidyb 
Export 
Subsidyb 
Import 
tax 
Import 
tax 
Africa -0.7 -0.5 17.7 11.8 -0.8 0.0 14.9 11.8 
Egypt 0.3 0.0 5.2 9.9 0.0 0.0 4.8 9.9 
Madagascar 0.5 -21.8 3.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.9 
Mozambique 0.7 -0.3 19.4 9.5 -0.1 0.0 10.1 9.5 
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 44.6 21.5 0.1 0.0 29.2 21.5 
Senegal -0.3 -1.3 8.7 9.1 0.0 0.0 9.4 9.1 
South Africa 0.0 0.0 11.9 6.4 0.0 0.0 7.3 6.4 
Uganda 0.5 -7.1 8.5 4.9 0.0 0.0 6.9 4.9 
Tanzania 0.4 0.0 19.1 9.3 -0.3 0.0 14.5 9.3 
Zambia -0.4 0.0 8.3 7.7 -0.8 0.0 7.2 7.7 
Zimbabwe -3.6 0.0 11.9 13.8 -3.4 0.0 14.2 13.8 
Rest of Africa -0.4 0.0 13.7 11.8 -0.4 0.0 12.8 11.8 
East and South Asia 2.1 -0.3 20.4 5.9 0.7 0.0 32.6 6.5 
China 0.0 0.5 8.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 21.4 6.3 
Korea -0.1 0.0 93.8 4.5 0.0 0.0 129.7 4.5 
Taiwan -0.4 0.0 23.3 3.3 -0.4 0.0 17.1 3.3 
Indonesia 0.0 -1.6 5.1 4.4 0.0 0.0 4.6 4.4 
Malaysia 0.2 -0.1 8.1 5.2 0.0 0.0 7.2 5.2 
Philippines -4.6 0.0 6.8 3.0 -4.6 0.0 10.8 3.0 
Thailand -0.2 0.0 25.2 8.6 -0.1 0.0 18.6 8.6 
Vietnam -3.5 -4.4 14.7 12.5 -3.5 0.0 10.5 12.5 
Bangladesh -1.1 0.0 19.2 18.9 -1.1 0.0 13.7 18.9 
India 10.4 1.7 8.1 13.1 4.0 0.0 60.8 13.1 
Pakistan 0.0 -2.1 13.7 16.3 0.0 0.0 19.9 16.3 
Sri Lanka 0.9 -4.8 18.8 5.2 0.5 0.0 19.1 5.2 
Rest of East & South Asia -0.9 0.0 3.8 1.7 -0.5 0.0 8.1 11.2 
Latin America -0.3 -5.4 6.7 6.1 -0.8 0.0 6.7 6.1 
Argentina 0.0 -19.4 0.0 6.0 -4.7 0.0 2.2 6.0 
Brazil 0.0 0.0 3.8 8.5 0.0 0.0 2.9 8.5 
Chile 0.1 0.0 3.4 2.0 -1.6 0.0 1.4 2.0 
Colombia -0.1 0.0 12.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 12.4 9.8 
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 12.1 9.2 0.0 0.0 8.9 9.2 
Mexico 0.8 0.0 3.5 3.2 1.0 0.0 4.3 3.2 
Nicaragua 0.3 -8.6 11.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 8.9 3.7 
Rest of Latin America -1.6 0.2 10.0 9.4 -1.7 0.2 9.7 9.4 
EEurope & Central Asia 0.7 -0.8 15.3 3.1 0.8 1.1 10.3 3.1 
Baltic States 0.0 3.0 3.9 0.5 0.3 3.6 4.6 0.5 
Bulgaria 0.6 0.0 18.9 6.9 0.6 0.0 21.5 6.9 
Czech Republic 0.4 3.5 3.2 0.3 0.6 3.7 3.3 0.3 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (continued): Structure of producer price distortions in global goods markets,a 
2004  
(percent) 
 
 DAI Database GTAP V7 Database 
 
Primary 
Agriculture 
Agriculture and 
Lightly Processed 
Food 
Other 
goods 
Primary 
Agriculture 
Agriculture and 
Lightly Processed 
Food 
Other 
goods 
Production 
subsidyb 
Export 
subsidyb 
Import 
tax 
Import 
tax 
Production 
subsidyb 
Export 
Subsidyb 
Import 
tax 
Import 
tax 
Hungary 2.8 2.2 5.1 0.4 2.9 2.2 5.3 0.4 
Poland 0.3 3.2 5.1 0.4 0.3 3.4 5.1 0.4 
Romania 1.3 0.0 21.7 6.3 1.3 0.0 23.8 6.3 
Slovakia -0.2 0.8 5.5 0.3 0.0 0.8 5.7 0.3 
Slovenia -1.3 5.4 5.6 0.3 0.0 5.5 5.2 0.3 
Russia 1.7 -1.9 24.0 9.9 1.7 0.0 10.7 9.9 
Kazakhstan -0.7 0.0 4.0 4.0 -0.8 0.0 2.6 4.0 
Turkey 0.8 0.0 18.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 14.7 1.4 
Rest of EEur & CAsia -1.0 -6.0 13.0 4.2 -0.5 0.0 12.0 3.9 
High-income countries 2.2 2.2 23.5 1.7 1.8 2.3 24.4 1.7 
Australia 0.0 0.0 0.8 4.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.1 
Canada 2.0 0.3 8.8 0.9 1.6 0.4 11.6 0.9 
EU15 1.0 8.9 17.2 1.5 0.9 9.1 17.8 1.5 
Japan 1.7 0.0 39.6 1.3 1.7 0.0 41.8 1.3 
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.1 
Rest of Western Europe 2.6 3.6 54.0 1.0 3.7 4.7 56.6 0.8 
USA 4.9 0.1 4.0 1.6 3.9 0.1 2.2 1.6 
Developing countries  0.4 -2.5 11.0 6.1 -0.4 0.2 13.6 6.4 
  Africa -0.7 -0.5 17.7 11.8 -0.8 0.0 14.9 11.8 
  East Asia  -0.3 -0.5 8.4 5.6 -0.3 0.0 16.2 6.4 
  South Asia  7.4 0.5 12.2 13.6 2.9 0.0 34.2 13.6 
  Latin America -0.3 -5.4 6.7 6.1 -0.8 0.0 6.7 6.1 
  Middle East -11.4 0.0 8.6 6.7 -11.3 0.0 9.8 6.7 
  EEurope and CAsia 0.7 -0.8 15.3 3.1 0.8 1.1 10.3 3.1 
WORLD TOTAL 1.1 -0.5 17.2 3.4 0.5 1.1 19.0 3.4 
 
 
a The DAI database uses value of production at undistorted prices as weights to aggregate 
price distortions across products and countries. The GTAP database in the case of import 
taxes uses import values as the basis for weights (see Bouët et al. 2008). 
 
b The subsidy is net of any taxes, so a negative sign indicates a net tax on production or 
exports. No agricultural export taxes are included in the GTAP database. 
 
Source: DAI data from Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), based on calculations compiled 
by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008); GTAP data from Narayanan and Walmsley (2008). 
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Table 2: Impact on real income of full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by 
country/region, 2004 
(relative to the 2004 benchmark data, in 2004 US dollars and percent) 
  DAI Database GTAP V7 Database 
  
Total real 
income 
gain p.a. 
($billion) 
Change due 
just to 
change in 
terms of 
trade 
($billion) 
Total real 
income gain 
as % of 
benchmarka 
Total real 
income 
gain p.a. 
($billion) 
Change in 
income due 
just to 
change in 
terms of 
trade ($b) 
Total real 
income gain 
as % of 
benchmarka 
North & Sub-Sah Africa 0.9 -6.0 0.2  1.5 -5.0 0.3  
Egypt -0.2 -0.6 -0.3  -0.2 -0.6 -0.3  
Madagascar 0.0 0.0 -0.9  0.0 0.0 -1.3  
Mozambique 0.1 -0.1 2.4  0.1 0.0 1.5  
Nigeria 0.3 -0.6 0.7  0.2 -0.5 0.4  
Senegal 0.0 -0.1 -2.3  -0.1 -0.1 -2.9  
South Africa 0.2 -0.7 0.1  0.6 -0.4 0.4  
Uganda 0.0 0.0 -0.6  0.0 0.0 -0.3  
Tanzania 0.0 0.0 -0.5  0.0 0.0 -0.4  
Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.1  0.0 0.0 0.1  
Zimbabwe 0.1 0.0 3.4  0.1 0.0 3.3  
Rest of Africa 0.5 -3.8 0.2  1.0 -3.3 0.4  
East and South Asia 29.7 -4.9 0.9  55.1 -11.5 1.6  
China 3.3 0.5 0.2  7.7 -0.4 0.6  
Korea 14.0 0.2 2.8  27.9 -4.8 5.5  
Taiwan 1.0 0.0 0.4  1.4 -0.1 0.6  
Indonesia 0.5 0.0 0.2  1.1 0.4 0.5  
Malaysia 4.2 -1.0 4.7  5.4 -0.6 6.0  
Philippines 0.0 -0.5 0.1  0.0 -0.8 0.0  
Thailand 3.3 -0.1 1.4  2.9 -0.5 1.2  
Vietnam 1.9 -0.9 5.3  3.6 0.2 10.2  
Bangladesh -0.2 -0.8 -0.4  -0.3 -0.7 -0.7  
India -0.8 -2.9 -0.2  3.2 -4.7 0.6  
Pakistan -0.1 -0.6 -0.2  -0.3 -0.7 -0.3  
Sri Lanka 0.8 0.5 5.1  1.0 0.6 6.1  
Rest of East & Sth. Asia 1.9 0.8 1.4  1.5 0.5 2.6  
Latin America  15.8 2.5 1.0  13.6 4.1 0.8  
Argentina 3.2 -0.7 2.6  1.3 0.4 1.1  
Brazil 6.8 5.6 1.6  7.0 6.5 1.6  
Chile 0.3 0.2 0.4  0.1 -0.1 0.1  
Colombia 2.2 0.7 3.1  2.2 0.9 3.1  
Ecuador 2.0 1.1 8.2  2.0 1.1 8.6  
Mexico -0.7 -3.4 -0.1  -0.4 -3.3 -0.1  
Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 1.3  0.0 0.0 -0.1  
Rest of Latin America 2.0 -1.0 0.5  1.5 -1.4 0.4  
(continued) 
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Table 2 (continued): Impact on real income of full liberalization of global merchandise trade, 
by country/region, 2004 
 
         
         
EEurope & Central Asia 14.2 -3.6 1.2  12.8 -2.0 1.0  
Baltic States 0.5 0.1 1.8  0.6 0.0 1.9  
Bulgaria 0.2 -0.2 1.4  0.2 -0.1 1.9  
Czech Republic 1.0 -0.1 1.4  1.1 -0.1 1.6  
Hungary 0.4 -0.1 0.6  0.6 -0.1 0.8  
Poland 2.0 0.1 1.2  2.1 0.1 1.3  
Romania -0.1 -0.7 -0.3  0.0 -0.6 -0.1  
Slovakia 0.7 0.1 2.3  0.7 0.1 2.4  
Slovenia 0.3 0.1 1.5  0.4 0.1 1.6  
Russia 5.4 -3.1 1.2  1.5 -2.1 0.3  
Kazakhstan 0.4 0.2 1.1  0.4 0.2 1.2  
Turkey 1.3 -0.5 0.6  1.7 -0.4 0.8  
Rest of EE & Cent. Asia 2.2 0.5 2.1  3.5 0.9 2.9  
High-income countries 102.8 11.3 0.5  118.3 13.8 0.5  
Australia 2.4 1.9 0.5  3.0 2.2 0.6  
Canada 0.6 -1.2 0.1  1.8 -0.7 0.3  
EU 15 56.8 -3.8 0.7  62.6 -5.4 0.8  
Japan 23.1 10.4 0.7  29.8 12.6 0.9  
New Zealand 2.2 1.8 3.2  1.7 1.4 2.5  
Rest of Western Europe 13.1 -0.1 2.7  14.6 0.7 3.1  
United States 2.8 0.9 0.0  2.8 1.3 0.0  
Hong Kong & Singapore 1.7 1.4 1.4  2.1 1.7 1.0  
Developing countries 64.9 -12.2 0.9  91.6 -14.3 1.2  
North Africa 0.9 -2.8 0.5  1.5 -2.6 0.8  
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 -3.2 0.0  0.0 -2.4 0.0  
East Asia  30.1 -1.0 1.1  51.6 -6.0 1.9  
South Asia -0.4 -3.9 -0.1  3.5 -5.6 0.5  
Latin America  15.8 2.5 1.0  13.6 4.1 0.8  
Middle East 4.2 -0.2 0.8  8.6 0.2 1.6  
EEurope & Central Asia 14.2 -3.6 1.2  12.8 -2.0 1.0  
World total 167.7 -1.0 0.6  209.9 -0.5 0.7  
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to terms of trade effects. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
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Table 3: Regional and sectoral sources of welfare gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade,a 2004 
 
(relative to the 2004 benchmark data in 2004, percentb) 
 
  Using DAI Database Using GTAP V7 Database 
        
  Developing 
High-
income World Developing 
High-
income World 
Developing countries liberalize:       
Agriculture and food 49 4 21 62 7 31 
Manufacturing and services 8 36 25 6 32 20 
Total 57 40 46 68 39 51 
         
High-income countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food 23 65 49 18 66 45 
Manufacturing and services 20 -5 5 14 -5 4 
Total 43 60 54 32 61 49 
         
All countries liberalize:         
Agriculture and food 72 69 70 80 73 76 
Manufacturing and services 28 31 30 20 27 24 
Total 39 61 100 44 56 100 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum 
to 100 percent 
 
b Percentage in last row refers to the total regional gain relative to the world total. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
11 
 
Table 4: Impact of full global liberalization on shares of global output exported, and 
developing country shares of global output and exports,a by product, 2004 
 
(percent) 
 
 
Share of global 
output exporteda 
Developing 
countries' share of 
global output 
Developing countries' 
share of global 
exportsa 
  
Bench-
mark 
Global 
lib - 
DAI 
Global 
lib - 
GTAP 
Bench-
mark 
Global 
lib - 
DAI 
Global 
lib - 
GTAP 
Bench-
mark 
Global 
lib - 
DAI 
Global 
lib - 
GTAP 
             
Paddy rice 1 2 2 81 82 83 56 42 65 
Wheat 16 22 27 67 71 67 25 39 36 
Other grains 11 15 16 55 57 56 35 56 49 
Oil seeds 21 28 25 69 74 74 54 68 68 
Plant-based fibers 25 25 32 74 83 74 50 79 56 
Vegetables and fruits 9 15 16 72 77 77 69 80 81 
Other crops 14 17 18 49 49 50 75 62 69 
Cattle sheep etc 2 2 2 43 48 50 56 59 64 
Other livestock 4 4 5 65 67 68 43 46 55 
Wool 13 14 18 82 81 77 16 18 15 
Beef and sheep meat 7 21 22 27 41 43 31 68 71 
Other meat products 7 12 13 32 34 35 42 45 42 
Vegetable oils and fats 20 30 31 52 58 58 80 84 85 
Dairy products 5 11 11 29 33 35 28 41 48 
Processed rice 5 7 7 76 79 78 85 87 87 
Refined sugar 8 42 39 52 85 83 78 90 89 
Other food, bev.& tob. 9 12 12 35 36 37 50 59 61 
Other prim. products 31 33 32 64 63 63 76 76 76 
Textile and clothing 28 35 35 53 57 57 74 77 77 
Other manufacturing 24 26 26 32 31 30 43 43 41 
Services 3 3 3 20 20 20 31 30 28 
Agriculture and food 8 13 14 46 50 50 54 64 64 
Agriculture 8 11 12 62 65 65 55 64 64 
Processed foods 8 14 15 37 40 41 52 63 64 
 
a excluding intra-EU trade. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
12 
 
Table 5: Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output and 
trade, by country/region, 2004 
 
(relative to 2004 benchmark data, in percent) 
 
  Using DAI Database 
Using GTAP V7 
Database 
  Output Exports Imports Output Exports Imports 
High-income countries -13 -4 38 -14 -3 38 
Australia 20 41 11 22 52 16 
Canada -2 24 33 2 56 51 
EU 15 -21 -29 32 -24 -37 34 
Japan -23 88 69 -24 156 64 
New Zealand 47 74 27 39 61 24 
Rest of Western Europe -19 312 133 -25 406 124 
United States -3 1 32 0 12 25 
Hong Kong and Singapore 2 6 2 10 32 5 
Developing countries 7 100 40 7 112 55 
North Africa 17 377 63 19 411 61 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 42 32 3 46 25 
East Asia  4 77 37 5 128 70 
South Asia 0 108 33 -3 132 128 
Latin America  27 106 30 26 93 23 
  (of which Argentina 38 96 82 24 38 1) 
Middle East 22 223 12 20 247 26 
EEurope & Central Asia -3 80 78 0 97 61 
World total -3 39 39 -3 45 45 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
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Table 6: Impact of global liberalization on share of agricultural and food production 
exported by country/region, 2004 
 
(percent) 
  2004  
bench-
mark 
 data 
Full global liberalization 
 
Using DAI 
database 
Using 
GTAP 
database 
    
Developing countries 9.5 16.9 17.5 
North Africa 6.3 20.6 21.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.8 19.3 19.2 
East Asia  8.4 15.1 16.7 
South Asia 3.7 7.5 8.5 
Latin America  18.1 28.2 27.5 
Middle East 7.4 17.2 18.7 
EEurope & Central Asia 6.8 11.1 11.4 
High-income countries 13.0 14.1 14.1 
World total 11.4 15.4 15.8 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations. 
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Table 7: Impact of global liberalization on agricultural and food self-sufficiency,a 2004 
 
(percent) 
 
 High-income countries Developing countries 
  Bench-
mark 
Global lib Bench-
mark  
Global lib 
 
Using 
 DAI  
database 
Using 
GTAP 
database 
Using 
 DAI  
database 
Using 
GTAP 
database 
Paddy rice 101 105 101 100 99 100 
Wheat 141 140 154 88 89 85 
Other grains 108 102 106 94 98 96 
Oil seeds 104 92 93 97 103 103 
Plant-based fibers 161 112 177 88 97 87 
Vegetables and fruits 90 78 76 105 109 110 
Other crops 90 91 89 113 110 114 
Cattle sheep etc 100 100 99 100 100 101 
Other livestock 101 101 100 100 100 100 
Wool 161 180 207 92 91 86 
Beef and sheep meat 101 85 83 97 134 138 
Other meat products 100 99 98 100 103 104 
Vegetable oils & fats 95 85 85 103 114 115 
Dairy products 103 100 98 94 101 104 
Processed rice 99 95 95 100 101 102 
Refined sugar 98 41 48 102 133 128 
Other food bev.&tob. 99 97 97 103 105 106 
Other prim. products 76 76 76 122 122 122 
Textile&wearing app. 81 76 76 123 128 128 
Other manufacturing 101 102 102 98 96 96 
Services 101 101 101 101 101 100 
All agriculture& food 100 95 95 101 105 105 
    Primary agriculture 99 96 96 100 102 102 
    Processed foods 100 95 95 101 108 109 
 
a Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic 
consumption measured in value terms at fob prices. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
  
Table 8: Impact of full global liberalization on real international product prices,a 2004 
 
(percent relative to 2004 baseline) 
 
 DAI database GTAP database 
  
Agric-
ultural 
 policies 
All goods 
sectors' 
policies 
Agric-
ultural 
 policies 
All goods 
sectors' 
policies 
     
Paddy rice 6.9 6.6 4.9 4.1 
Wheat 1.8 1.4 3.3 2.1 
Other grains 2.6 2.7 4.7 3.6 
Oil seeds -2.2 -2.4 3.8 2.6 
Sugar cane and beet -1.1 -2.0 -1.1 -2.5 
Plant-based fibers 4.7 2.9 2.3 0.5 
Vegetables and fruits 2.4 1.8 2.3 1.8 
Other crops 1.7 1.0 2.1 1.4 
Cattle sheep etc -0.2 -1.1 -1.1 -2.1 
Other livestock -1.2 -2.1 -1.8 -2.8 
Raw milk 0.7 -0.2 0.0 -2.4 
Wool 3.5 3.3 4.5 4.2 
Beef and sheep meat 5.6 4.6 5.7 4.6 
Other meat products 1.3 0.6 0.4 -0.4 
Vegetable oils and fats -1.4 -1.9 -10.0 -10.3 
Dairy products 4.6 3.8 3.9 2.8 
Processed rice 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.5 
Refined sugar 2.5 1.3 2.9 1.5 
Other food, beverages and tob. -1.7 -1.3 -2.7 -3.0 
Textile and wearing apparel 0.3 -1.2 -0.2 -1.7 
Other manufacturing 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 
All agriculture and food 0.8 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 
     
 
a  Model numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' manufactured exports 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations 
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Table 9: Effects of full global liberalization of agricultural and all merchandise trade on 
sectoral value added, by country and region, 2004 
 
(relative to benchmark data, percent) 
 
  
  
DAI database GTAP database 
Agricultural 
policies 
All sectors' 
policies 
Agricultural 
policies 
All sectors' 
policies 
Agric 
Non-
agric Agric 
Non-
agric Agric 
Non-
agric Agric 
Non-
agric 
         
High-income countries -13.8 0.2 -14.7 0.1 -13.2 0.2 -14.5 0.2 
Australia 10.9 1.5 13.7 2.1 19.1 1.5 21.4 2.0 
Canada 3.4 0.3 5.3 -0.5 16.1 0.4 17.8 -0.4 
EU 15 -23.0 0.2 -25.4 -0.4 -25.4 0.1 -28.2 -0.4 
Japan -16.7 0.1 -16.8 2.3 -18.3 0.2 -18.6 2.4 
New Zealand 57.7 5.0 57.2 5.4 46.7 4.0 45.9 4.1 
Rest of Western Europe -25.8 1.0 -25.8 -1.3 -17.8 1.1 -19.9 1.6 
United States -5.7 0.2 -5.3 -0.2 -2.1 0.2 -2.2 -0.1 
Hong Kong & Singapore 3.7 0.4 2.2 2.1 1.6 0.4 0.3 1.1 
Developing countries 5.4 1.0 5.6 1.9 3.1 1.1 3.5 1.7 
North Africa -0.4 1.8 -1.1 0.8 3.1 1.8 1.5 0.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.3 -0.8 -0.5 2.0 0.3 0.8 -0.3 
East Asia  2.6 0.6 4.7 3.5 -0.3 1.0 1.7 4.1 
South Asia -5.1 1.1 -6.7 -0.3 -7.9 0.6 -9.0 -0.7 
Latin America  36.3 2.8 37.0 2.3 30.0 2.5 31.8 1.4 
  (of which Argentina 116.8 7.4 103.5 13.8 31.3 3.1 35.8 1.8 
EEurope & Central Asia -4.4 0.3 -5.2 0.3 -3.2 0.4 -4.1 -0.8 
World total -1.0 0.4 -1.2 0.5 -2.3 0.4 -2.5 0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations. 
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Table 10: Poverty effects of full global liberalization of merchandise trade reform, by region, 2004 
 
(a) the benchmark 
 
  Benchmark Poverty elasticities 
 $1/day $2/day $1/day $2/day 
 Headcount 
Number of 
poor Headcount 
Number of 
poor    
  (%) million (%) million     
China 10 128 35 452 -1.9 -1.3 
Other East Asia  9 41 50 232 -3.7 -2.1 
India 34 371 80 868 -1.1 -0.5 
Other South Asia 29 76 94 248 -2.5 -0.7 
EEurope & Central Asia 1 4 10 46 -1.7 -1.7 
Middle East & N. Africa 1 4 20 59 -2.5 -2.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 41 298 72 522 -0.7 -0.5 
Latin America  9 47 22 121 -1.7 -1.1 
All Developing countries  18 969 48 2548    
 
(continued)
  
Table 10 (continued): Poverty effects of full global liberalization of merchandise trade reform, by region, 2004 
 
 
(b) DAI database 
  $1/day $2/day Change in no. of poor 
 
Income 
change, 
real Headcount 
Number 
of poor Headcount 
Number 
of poor $1/day $2/day 
 (%) (%) million (%) million million million 
China 2.1 9 123 34 440 -5 -12 
Other East Asia  8.1 6 29 42 192 -12 -40 
India -3.8 36 386 82 883 15 15 
Other South Asia 4.0 26 68 92 241 -8 -7 
EEurope & Central Asia 4.5 1 4 9 43 -0 -4 
Middle East & N. Africa 14.3 1 3 13 40 -2 -19 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3 39 287 70 508 -11 -14 
Latin America  4.1 8 44 21 115 -3 -6 
All developing countries 5.9 18 944 46 2462 -26 -87 
 
(continued) 
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Table 10 (continued): Poverty effects of full global liberalization of merchandise trade reform, by region, 2004 
 
 
(c) GTAP database 
  $1/day $2/day Change in no. of poor 
 
Income 
change, 
reala Headcount 
Number 
of poor Headcount 
Number 
of poor $1/day $2/day 
 (%) (%) million (%) million million million 
China 3.5 9 120 33 432 -8 -21 
Other East Asia  9.5 6 26 40 185 -14 -46 
India 2.8 33 359 79 857 -11 -11 
Other South Asia 4.1 26 68 91 241 -8 -7 
EEurope & Central Asia 2.5 1 4 9 44 0 -2 
Middle East & N. Africa 16.6 1 3 12 37 -2 -22 
Sub Saharan Africa 5.0 40 288 70 509 -11 -13 
Latin America  3.5 8 44 21 116 -3 -5 
All developing countries  5.9 17 912 45 2420 -58 -128 
 
 
a Nominal unskilled wage deflated by the food and clothing CPI 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank Linkage model simulations.    
  
 
Table 11: Relationship between NRA and income, arable land endowment and a product’s trade status, developing countries, 2004  
 
(endogenous variable: NRA) 
 
  Beef Cotton Maize Milk Pigmeat Poultry Rice Soybean Sugar Wheat 
Exogenous 
variables: 
                                
YPC 0.378*** 0.150** 0.0222 0.198*** 0.0895 0.197** 0.396*** 0.330* 0.268*** 0.0555* 
 
(0.0662) (0.0655) (0.0306) (0.0594) (0.0579) (0.0928) (0.0891) (0.173) (0.0542) (0.0306) 
LPC -0.200** -0.0477 -0.0735 -0.265*** -0.135* -0.265* -0.725*** -0.849** -0.122 -0.122* 
 
(0.0977) (0.120) (0.0717) (0.0817) (0.0776) (0.145) (0.173) (0.311) (0.112) (0.0691) 
TSIi -0.169 -0.00249 -0.00486 -0.0383 -0.0795 -0.354* -0.369** 0.115 -0.176 -0.114 
 
(0.120) (0.107) (0.0747) (0.101) (0.0973) (0.187) (0.159) (0.328) (0.126) (0.0733) 
Constant -2.978*** -1.227** -0.141 -1.483*** -0.693 -1.439* -3.701*** -3.517** -1.295*** -0.481* 
 
(0.592) (0.552) (0.261) (0.530) (0.522) (0.833) (0.766) (1.561) (0.482) (0.271) 
           Observations 44 22 56 41 35 42 37 26 57 53 
R-squared 0.554 0.241 0.031 0.410 0.214 0.268 0.527 0.309 0.336 0.265 
Adj. R-squared 0.521 0.114 -0.0248 0.362 0.138 0.210 0.484 0.215 0.298 0.220 
 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
      Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
       
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2011), based on NRA estimates and other variable data compiled from the World Bank (World Development 
Indicators) and the United Nations (COMTRADE data) by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
  
Table 12: NRA averages by region and product, estimated 2004 (DAI database) and projected 
2030  
 
(percent, using 2004 value of production at undistorted prices as weights) 
 
Asia 2004 2030 Latin America   
Beef 72 38 Beef -8 24 
Cotton 1 7 Cotton 1 0 
Maize 7 23 Maize -9 14 
Milk 21 14 Milk 32 51 
Pigmeat 2 18 Pigmeat -8 25 
Poultry 4 17 Poultry 11 15 
Rice 14 85 Rice 31 55 
Soybean 9 33 Soybean -8 0 
Sugar 49 92 Sugar 22 21 
Wheat 13 30 Wheat -7 13 
   
   
   
High-income countries   
Africa 
  
Beef 36 36 
Beef -23 17 Cotton 26 26 
Cotton -35 0 Maize 17 17 
Maize -13 12 Milk 62 62 
Milk -2 13 Pigmeat 15 15 
Poultry 20 5 Poultry 23 23 
Rice -5 34 Rice 328 328 
Soybean -49 0 Soybean 3 3 
Sugar 51 51 Sugar 162 162 
Wheat 2 14 Wheat 3 3 
   
   
 
Source:  Anderson and Nelgen (2011)
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Table 13: NRA ten-product averages by country, estimated 2004 (DAI database) and 
projected 2030 
  
(percent, using 2004 value of production at undistorted prices as weights) 
 
(a) by country 
 
2004 
 
2030 
 
 2004 
 
2030 
 
Bangladesh -4 172 Madagascar 11 30 
China 2 30 Mali 43 1 
India 22 27 Mozambique 65 55 
Indonesia 15 113 Nigeria -16 32 
Korea 258 166 Senegal 4 27 
Malaysia 65 71 South Africa 4 26 
Pakistan -1 22 Sudan -15 9 
Philippines 10 91 Tanzania -1 22 
Sri Lanka -9 0 Togo 6 1 
Thailand 1 27 Uganda 6 34 
Vietnam 26 48 Zambia -41 16 
Benin 0 0 Zimbabwe -75 15 
Burkina Faso 0 0 Argentina -23 0 
Cameroon 0 12 Brazil 5 4 
Chad 0 0 Chile 0 72 
Cote d'Ivoire 9 19 Colombia 25 67 
Egypt -11 9 Dominican Rep. 24 11 
Ethiopia -2 15 Mexico 0 43 
Ghana 46 20 Nicaragua -6 8 
Kenya 7 15    
   
   
   
   
   
   
(b) by region 
  
   
   
 
 
2004 
 
2030 
 
   
Asia 11 42    
Africa -9 16    
Latin America -1 17    
All developing  7 35    
All high-income  35 35    
World 20 35    
 
 
Source:  Anderson and Nelgen (2011) 
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Table 14: Average import-weighted tariff protection rates, by sector, 2030 
 
(percent) 
 
 
  
2030 rates assuming no policy changes 
(same as 2004, DAI database)a 
 
 
2030 agric & 
food  rates, 
assuming 
higher 
developing 
country agric 
protectiona 
 Agric & 
processed 
 food 
Other  
Primary 
Manuf-
actures 
Western Europe 5.0 0.1 1.1 5.0 
Eastern Europe & Russia 12.9 0.6 5.5 12.8 
United States & Canada 5.9 0.2 1.8 6.1 
Australia & New Zealand 2.2 0.0 4.1 2.2 
Japan 24.2 0.0 1.1 24.7 
China 10.9 0.8 6.5 20.4 
ASEAN 13.1 0.7 4.6 19.6 
Pacific Islands 22.4 0.6 7.9 32.4 
Rest of East Asia 26.6 4.3 3.4 36.8 
India 11.8 10.5 13.5 30.0 
Rest of South Asia 13.1 5.3 14.8 18.9 
Central Asia 10.3 0.1 5.5 23.4 
Latin America 7.5 1.6 7.0 20.0 
Middle East & Africa 13.1 2.6 9.4 26.6 
High-income countries 7.3 0.2 1.7 7.3 
Developing countriesb 12.3 3.3 6.7 23.0 
Total 10.3 2.1 3.7 16.2 
 
a See text for description of the two alternative simulations. 
 
b Developing countries are defined here as all but the first five in the above list (and so include 
Central Asia). Turkey is included in ‘Eastern Europe’; the new EU27 members of Central and 
SE Europe are included in ‘Western Europe’, since they had all joined the EU by 2007. 
 
Source: Anderson and Strutt (2011). 
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Table 15: Effects of full global liberalization of agricultural and other merchandise trade on 
global economic welfare, by sectoral policies and regions, without and with developing 
country agricultural protection growth,a 2030 
 
(a) Assuming 2030 distortion rates unchanged from 2004 
 
  Regional gain (2004$USbillion) Regional gain (%) 
  Developing  
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
All  
countries  
Developing 
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
All  
countries 
Developing countries liberalize      
 Agric and food 68 15 84 34 11 25 
 Other products 87 29 116 43 22 34 
 All products 155 45 200 76 33 59 
High-income countries liberalize          
 Agric and food 20 105 125 10 78 37 
 Other products 29 -15 15 14 -11 4 
 All products 49 91 140 24 67 41 
All countries liberalize           
 Agric and food 88 121 209 43 89 62 
 Other products 116 15 131 57 11 39 
 All products 204 136 340 100 100 100 
 
 
 
(b) Assuming agricultural protection growth in developing countries from 2004 to 2030 
 
  Developing  
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
All  
countries  
Developing 
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
All  
countries 
Developing countries liberalize      
 Agric and food 87 26 114 38 18 30 
 Other products 90 30 120 39 20 32 
 All products 177 56 233 78 38 62 
High-income countries liberalize          
 Agric and food 20 107 126 9 72 34 
 Other products 32 -15 17 14 -10 4 
 All products 51 92 143 23 62 38 
All countries liberalize           
 Agric and food 107 133 240 47 90 64 
 Other products 121 15 136 53 10 36 
 All products 228 148 376 100 100 100 
 
 
a See text for description of the two alternative simulations. 
 
Source: Anderson and Strutt (2011). 
  
Table 16: Effects of full global liberalization of agricultural and other merchandise trade on 
global economic welfare, by country/region, without and with developing country agricultural 
protection growth, 2030 
 
(2004 US$ billion per year) 
 
 Assuming 2030 
distortion rates 
unchanged  
from 2004a 
Assuming agric 
protection growth 
in developing 
countries from  
2004 to 2030a 
Western Europe 60.2 65.2 
Eastern Europe & Russia 17.0 20.4 
United States & Canada 5.0 18.7 
Australia & New Zealand 6.8 8.4 
Japan 32.1 30.8 
China 30.2 25.2 
ASEAN 37.6 38.5 
Pacific Islands 1.0 1.2 
Rest of East Asia 38.8 37.2 
India 28.4 35.1 
Rest of South Asia 6.3 0.3 
Central Asia 3.3 4.4 
Latin America 25.6 34.3 
Middle East & Africa 47.8 56.6 
High-income countries 121.1 143.6 
Developing countriesb 218.8 232.8 
Total 339.9 376.4 
 
a See text for description of the two alternative simulations. 
 
b Developing countries are defined as all but the first five in the above list (and so include 
Central Asia). Turkey is included in ‘Eastern Europe’; the new EU27 members of Central and 
SE Europe are included in ‘Western Europe’. 
 
Source: Anderson and Strutt (2011). 
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Table 17: Impacts on real incomes of full global merchandise trade liberalization and Doha 
partial liberalization, 2025 
(2004 US$ billion per year) 
 
  Total global lib’n  Partial Doha liberalization 
  Wtd Ave σ =2 Wtd Ave σ =2  σ=5 
Australia and New Zealand 16.1 16.8 1.9 2.4 3.6 
EFTA 20.0 31.6 3.0 4.2 6.2 
EU 27 135.3 180.4 29.6 39.3 52.9 
United States 47.9 53.8 6.4 9.9 14.1 
Canada 7.3 8.6 0.2 0.8 1.7 
Japan 52.0 64.9 18.4 21.8 26.1 
Korea and Taiwan 77.1 98.7 9.3 9.8 10.5 
Hong Kong and Singapore 28.7 29.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Chile 2.2 2.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Bangladesh -0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 
Brazil 21.7 30.8 4.2 4.7 6.0 
China -21.4 -8.6 5.7 8.9 13.9 
Egypt 1.2 10.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
India 18.9 24.3 2.5 2b.4 2.4 
Nigeria 3.0 6.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Pakistan 4.1 4.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Indonesia 2.8 3.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Thailand 6.6 8.7 1.8 2.6 4.2 
Mexico 5.7 10.1 3.7 4.7 5.8 
South African Customs Union 3.8 14.1 0.7 1.3 2.2 
Turkey 8.2 11.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Rest of Asia 6.8 24.5 -1.6 -1.2 -0.3 
Morocco and Tunisia 3.5 6.1 0.9 1.6 2.7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 9.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
Rest of Latin America & Carib. 11.8 18.5 2.2 2.5 2.8 
Rest of the world 26.4 64.3 1.4 1.9 2.5 
High income countries 384.4 484 71.3 90.7 117.6 
Developing countries 111.4 241.2 22.2 30.7 43.7 
    Latin America & Caribbean 41.5 61.6 10.4 12.1 14.8 
    Sub-Saharan Africa 13.2 30.4 0.1 0.6 1.5 
World total 495.8 725.2 93.5 121.4 161.3 
 
Source: Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2012) 
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